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This thesis analyzes the arguments concerning the abolition of nuclear weapons, 
specifically the feasibility and desirability of nuclear disarmament. Past attempts at nuclear 
disarmament and relevant international treaties and legal opinions also are discussed. The 
nuclear disarmament movement has grown considerably since the end of the Cold War. 
As the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons gains influence, it may have an increasing 
impact upon national security policy. Abolitionists argue that nuclear disarmament is both 
desirable and feasible. This thesis concludes that nuclear disarmament is not feasible and 
that abolitionist arguments for the desirability of nuclear disarmament are flawed. States 
will continue to maintain nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. It would be unwise 
and dangerous for the United States to pursue a policy of nuclear disarmam~nt in the near 
term. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The nuclear abolition movement has historical roots dating back to the Manhattan 
project, but it has been given new impetus with the end of the Cold War. As ideas to 
eliminate nuclear weapons gain influence, they may have a corresponding impact upon 
policy and, ultimately, U.S. national security. This thesis is divided into three sections. 
First, an overview of past abolition attempts is presented. Second, the arguments 
concerning the desirability of abolition are discussed. Third, the arguments for and against 
the feasibility of complete disarmament are analyzed. Advocates of a nuclear-weapons-
free-world (NWFW) argue that it is both desirable and feasible to eliminate nuclear 
weapons. This thesis shows, however, that abolition is neither desirable nor feasible in the 
foreseeable future. Further, it suggests that near-term efforts to pursue abolition could 
endanger the security of the United States. 
Chapter II analyzes the nuclear disarmament movement. The Baruch Plan, as 
presented by U.S. representative Bernard Baruch to the United Nations in 1946, was the 
first meaningful effort toward abolition. It eventually failed due to disagreements on 
verification and enforcement measures. These obstacles continue to hinder attempts at 
nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ), and recent international legal opinions are analyzed. These 
are all often cited by abolitionists in their arguments for the declining legitimacy of nuclear 
w;eapons. 
Chapter III analyzes the arguments about the desirability of nuclear disarmament. 
, 
Abolitionists voice three core' reasons why nuclear disarmament is desirable. First, they 
lX 
argue that nuclear weapons have no military utility aside from the belief that they deter 
attack by nuclear weapons. Additionally, abolitionists argue that the deterrent value of 
nuclear weapons against other forms ofWMD is suspect. Second, abolitionists assert that 
the indefinite deployment of nuclear weapons carries with it a high risk of accidental or 
unauthorized use. Third, they suggest that the possession of nuclear weapons by some 
states stimulates other nations to acquire them, thereby fostering proliferation and 
reducing the security of all. 
Each element of this argument is flawed. Nuclear weapons can be used for many 
purposes beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. A short list of uses 
would include deterring other types ofWMD (chemical and biological weapons), deterring 
conventional wars, gaining prestige, and exerting political leverage. In examining the risk 
of accidental or unauthorized use, abolitionists overlook the fact that severe reductions in 
nuclear arsenals might weaken or eliminate nuclear deterrence, creating greater incentives 
to conduct pre-emptive or preventive attacks. Additionally, a nuclear re-armament race 
resulting from a crisis in a NWFW would be an extremely dangerous situation with a high 
risk of purposeful or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In assessing the negative impact 
of nuclear arsenals upon proliferation, abolitionists examine only one element of the 
debate, discounting the role that specific nuclear arsenals have had in inhibiting 
proliferation. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the abolitionist arguments for a NWFW is the 
fact that as numbers approached zero the marginal utility of a single weapon would 
skyrocket. Significant proliferation pressures would result, likely reversing any progress 
toward disarmament that had been made to that point. 
x 
Chapter IV analyzes the arguments concerning the feasibility of eliminating nuclear 
weapons. The Stimson Center's four-phase plan is representative of most plans to 
eliminate nuclear weapons. Abolitionists contend that a verification regime could be 
developed that would deter a state from breaking out of a NWFW regime. "Breakout" is 
defined as a state hiding or developing nuclear weapons in violation of a NWFW regime. 
Abolitionists assert that the spread of norms against use, testing, and proliferation would 
help mitigate the danger of breakout. They contend that, if breakout occurred, the 
combined efforts of the rest of the world could deal with the offending state, forcing 
compliance with the regime. 
Breakout is the main issue preventing a NWFW from being a feasible option. 
There would be great incentives for states to cheat in a NWFW. No regime could be 
developed that could verify compliance with a nuclear disarmament agreement. Further, 
enforcement measures against an acknowledged breakout state - whether they involved 
economic sanctions or military intervention - would likely be ineffective in forcing that 
state to roll back its nuclear capability. 
The total elimination of nuclear weapons is a goal to which the United States (as a 
signatory of the NPT) aspires, in the context of general and complete disarmament. 
However, the realities of the current international order prevent such a goal from being 
realized in the foreseeable future. 
Xl 
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This thesis explores whether it would be prudent for the United States to pursue 
the abolition of nuclear weapons. Efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament have been 
made by the United States since the development of the first nuclear weapons, but 
significant obstacles have prevented them from being successful. Many abolitionists 
believe that with the end ofthe Cold War, there exists an unprecedented opportunity to 
abolish nuclear weapons. Abolitionists assert that complete nuclear disarmament is both 
feasible and desirable and that steps toward a Nuclear Weapon Free W orId (NWFW) 
should be taken immediately. There are many flaws, however, in the abolitionist 
position. This thesis concludes that it would not be prudent for America to support 
efforts toward abolition because nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable in 
the near term. 
Nuclear disarmament is a relevant topic to policy makers because the abolition 
movement may gain influence and prestige. With increasing influence, the idea of 
complete nuclear disarmament might shape national security policy. The topic also 
concerns officials responsible for intelligence, because significantly improved 
intelligence collection and analysis would be a required component of a NWFW 
verification regime. 
B.METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on an analysis of prominent writings for and against nuclear 
disarmament. Additionally, interviews were conducted with leading advocates and 
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opponents of nUclear-weapons abolition. 1 This thesis analyzes historical efforts towards 
abolition because problems preventing nuclear disarmament in the past remain relevant. 
The arguments for the feasibility and desirability of abolition are analyzed and shown to 
be flawed. Possible effects of a NWFW such as the increased value of nuclear weapons, 
its impact upon proliferation, and the likelihood of dangerous re-armament races are also 
explored to demonstrate how a NWFW may be less desirable than a stable configuration 
of nuclear states. 
C. OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into three sections. First, an overview of past abolition 
attempts is presented. Second, the arguments concerning the desirability of abolition are 
discussed. Third, the arguments for and against the feasibility of complete disarmament. 
are analyzed. 
Chapter II describes the nuclear disarmament movement. The Baruch Plan, as 
presented by U.S. representative Bernard Baruch to the United Nations in 1946, was the 
first meaningful effort toward -abolition. It eventually failed due to disagreements on 
verification and enforcement measures. These issues continue to prevent nuclear 
disarmament from being a feasible goal. Additionally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, and recent international rulings, which are all often 
cited by abolitionists, are analyzed. 
Chapter III examines the arguments regarding the desirability of near-term nuclear 
disarmament. Abolitionists use three main reasons to assert the desirability of nuclear 
1 See Appendix A for a list of individuals interviewed. 
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disannament: nuclear weapons lack utility; the risk of accidental or unauthorized use is 
unacceptably high; and the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries fosters 
proliferation. 
Each element of the argument for the desirability of nuclear disannament is 
flawed. Nuclear weapons can be used for many purposes other than deterring the use of 
nuclear weapons, including deterrence of chemical or biological or conventional 
aggression. Regarding the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, 
abolitionists overlook the fact that there are many practical measures short of 
disannament, which could reduce the danger of inadvertent use. Additionally, a NWFW 
could result in re-armament races in which safety would be a low priority. Abolitionists 
argue only one facet of the proliferation debate, discounting the role of existing nuclear 
arsenals (above all, that of the United States) in inhibiting-proliferation. Perhaps the 
greatest flaw in the abolitionist arguments for a NWFW is that they overlook the fact that 
the marginal utility of a single weapon would skyrocket as numbers approached zero. 
Significant proliferation pressures would result, likely reversing any progress toward 
nuclear disarmament that had been made to that point. In a sense, complete nuclear 
disannament is like a mirage: the closer one gets to it, the farther away it will appear. 
Chapter N analyzes the arguments concerning the feasibility of eliminating 
nuclear weapons. The four-phase plan for abolition as proposed by the Stimson Center is 
rep;esentative of most plans to eliminate nuclear weapons.2 Abolitionists contend that a 
verification regime could be developed that would deter a state from breaking out of a 
2 Michael Brown, Phased Nuclear Disarmament and US Defense Policy, Occasional Paper No. 
30, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996), accessed on 5 July 1998, available from 
http://www.stimson.org/zeronuke/index.html. 
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NWFW regime. "Breakout" is defined as a state hiding or developing nuclear weapons in 
violation of a NWFW regime. Abolitionists assert that the spread of norms against use, 
testing, and proliferation would help mitigate the danger of breakout. They contend that, 
if breakout occurred, the combined efforts of the rest of the world could deal with the 
offending state, forcing compliance with the regime. 
Breakout is the main issue preventing a NWFW from being a feasible option. 
There would be great incentives for states to cheat in a NWFW. No regime could be 
developed that could verify compliance with a nuclear disarmament agreement. Further, 
enforcement measures against an acknowledged break-out state - whether they involved 
economic sanctions or military intervention - would likely be ineffective in forcing that 
state to roll back its nuclear capability. 
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II. PAST ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to abolitionists, Cold War hostilities limited nuclear disarmament 
efforts between 1945 and 1989. They assert that the movement has been given new 
impetus, however, with the end of the Cold War, which has engendered greater 
possibilities for cooperation and trust. The Baruch Plan of 1946 was the first formal 
attempt to reach a nuclear disarmament agreement. Many elements of the Baruch Plan 
are evident in current nuclear disarmament proposals. Abolitionists assert that the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) legally obligates Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to eliminate 
their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones (NWFZ) and recent statements by 
the International Court of Justice (lCJ) are cited by abolitionists as proof of the declining 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons. 
An understanding of the history of the abolition movement is important because 
many of the issues that have prevented past plans (e.g. the Baruch Plan) from being 
instituted continue to make nuclear disarmament infeasible. This chapter shows that 
abolitionist arguments regarding the NPT, NWFWs, and the recent ICJ advisory opinion 
are flawed. For example, the obligation for nuclear disarmament in the NPT exists within 
the context of general and complete disarmament. Additionally, NWFZs and the ICJ 
advisory opinion do not prove that nuclear weapons are of declining legitimacy or that 
they are illegal. Despite dramatic changes in geopolitics since the end of the Cold War, 
significant factors preventing nuclear disarmament from being a desirable endeavor 
remain. 
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B. THE BARUCH PLAN 
Attempts were made to eliminate nuclear weapons almost as soon as their 
existence became publicly known following the American detonation of two atomic 
bombs over Japan. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took place after the 
United Nations (UN) Charter was signed in San Francisco in June 1945, but before the 
first meeting of the UN General Assembly in London in January 1946. Eight years later, 
John Foster Dulles, during his first year as Secretary of State, called the provisions of the 
UN Charter on the regulation of armaments obsolete before they entered into force.3 The 
Charter was conceived without any consideration for atomic weapons and their 
revolutionary implications. After intensive cooperation by the United States, Britain, and 
Canada, and concurrence by the Soviet Union, the first session of the UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution to establish an Atomic Energy Commission (ABC). The. 
Commission was charged to analyze the nuclear question and make specific proposals: 
(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information 
for peaceful ends; 
(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for 
peaceful purposes; 
(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic and of all other major 
weapons a,daptable to mass destruction; 
(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect 
complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.4 
The main reason for the creation of the ABC was to eliminate nuclear weapons and all 
other forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to implement a plan for the 
3 John Foster Dulles statement of 26 August 1953 before the American Bar Association, quoted in 
Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations/or Arms Control (WaShington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1961), 28. 




peaceful dissemination of nuclear knowledge. 
At the first meeting of the ABC in June 1946, Bernard Baruch, the U.S. 
representative, presented the U.S. proposal for an international atomic control system. 
This proposal became known as the Baruch Plan. The Baruch plan was a modification of 
a report prepared for the U.S. Government by a committee headed by then Under 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Consultants included David Lilienthal and Robert 
Oppenheimer. 5 An essential element of the Baruch Plan was its provision for complete 
international control of the entire process of producing atomic weapons, from mining of 
uranium to weaponization. This stipulation immediately raised the question of whether 
effective international control of atomic energy was possible. The drafters of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan believed it was. Both plans emphasized 
complete accountability of nuclear materials from mines to weapons.6 
President Harry Truman stated, "Mr. Baruch's principal contribution to the atomic 
energy program was that he transformed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report from a working 
paper into a formal, systematic proposal and that he added a section that called for 
sanctions against any 'nation violating the rules."? Baruch insisted upon the removal of 
veto authority for the five permanent members of the Security Council in matters relating 
to violations against a disarmament regime.8 Acheson was strongly against these 
5 For an in-depth discussion of the Baruch Plan, see Bechhoefer, 41-83. For a discussion on the 
process leading to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in 
the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 151-5. 
6 Bechhoefer, 42. 
7 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, Years o/Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 10. 
8 Bechhoefer, 55. 
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modifications, believing that "the only practicable safeguard in case of violations would 
be clear notice and warning that they were occurring. This would give other parties to the 
treaty knowledge that it was being breached and an opportunity to take such action ... for 
their own protection as might be possible. Provisions for paper police sanctions to be 
imposed by the same parties were only an illusion.,,9 In short, Acheson did not believe 
that threats of sanctions or military action would have any affect on cheaters. 
Because of objections by the Soviet Union, the Baruch plan was never 
implemented. The Soviets rejected any limitations on their veto authority within the UN 
Security Council. They also demanded that nuclear weapons be prohibited before the 
implementation of a materials and weapons control system. The United States demanded 
an effective control system before the elimination of its nuclear stockpile. lO The United 
States did not consider this point .negotiable. President Truman stated, "If we accepted 
the Russian position, we would be deprived of everything except their promise to agree to 
controls.. .. We should not under any circumstances throwaway our gun until we are sure 
the rest of the world c~'t arm against us."}} 
Robert Jervis has pointed out that the Baruch Plan failed because it would have 
restricted Soviet autonomy. The Soviet Union was not seeking equality, but, rather, the 
ability to pursue its own policies in complete freedom and without any interference or 
9 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1969), 155. 
10 Bechhoefer, 77. 
11 Truman, 11. 
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outside control. 12 The Soviets responded to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons by 
developing their own nuclear arsenal. Stalin was already engaged, by the end of W orId 
Warn, in a crash program to develop atomic weapons and break the American 
monopoly.13 It became evident that no Soviet regime would open itself to the kind of 
international control and verification that the Baruch Plan demanded. 
Ultimately, the ABC made no progress in its goals of developing international 
control over nuclear weapons and materials and nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union 
and the West could not agree on specific elements of the plans that each proposed. With 
the passage of a resolution by the General Assembly in 1952, the ABC was dissolved and 
transformed into the Disarmament Commission, which would attempt to deal with all 
aspects of arms reduction and elimination, both conventional and nuclear. The Cold War 
was fully underway, and any hopes for nuclear disarmament or international control 
quickly gave way to security concerns, which made disarmament endeavors pOlitically 
infeasible. 
The first, futile attempts to achieve nuclear disarmament demonstrated that key 
issues such as verification, enforcement, effective controls, and national security concerns 
needed to be solved before general and complete disarmament - including the abolition 
of nuclear weapons - would be possible. Acheson believed that no inspection regime 
would be sufficient to safeguard against cheating as long as national fissionable materials 
12 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1989),256. 
13 For a detailed analysis of the development of the Soviet nuclear weapon program, see: David 
HOlloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994). 
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production was allowed to continue.14 When the discussions on the Baruch proposals 
ended, it was clear that neither international ownership of nuclear materials nor a veto-
free right of the majority of signatory states to punish a violator would gain acceptance. lS 
C. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968 
and indefinitely extended in 1995, is frequently cited by abolitionists as a legal 
commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons. In the treaty's preamble all signatories 
declare "their intention ... to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.,,16 
Additionally, in article VI: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.17 
Thus, a goal of the NPT is nuclear disarmament. The inclusion of Article VI in the treaty 
was demanded by the non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS). Reciprocity was the key 
issue. The NNWS did not desire a permanent two-class system of nuclear "haves" and 
"have-nots. " 
14 Richard J. Barnet, "Inspection: Shadow and Substance," Security in Disarmament, ed. Richard 
J .. Barnet and Richard A. Fa1k (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 16. 
15 Ibid, 17. 
16 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an appendix in Beyond 1995, The Future 
of the NPT Regime, ed. Joseph F. Pilat and RobertE. Pendley (New York: Plenum Press, 1990), 177-8. 
17 Ibid, 180. 
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Abolitionists consider the two-class system hypocritical and, ultimately, 
impossible to maintain. For abolitionists, the NPT embodies a bargain. The majority of 
states would not acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) would 
negotiate and carry out plans for nuclear disarmament. In the view of some abolitionists, 
such as Frank Blackaby, the nuclear-weapon states have never attempted to meet their full 
obligation under the NPT.18 Abolitionists contend that a growing number of NNWS will 
assert their right. to develop nuclear weapons unless nuclear weapons are eliminated. 
Recent tests by India and Pakistan are cited by abolitionists as evidence that the two-class 
system cannot be maintained indefinitely and is already falling apart.19 
Nuclear arms reduction efforts made since the end of the Cold War by the five 
NPT-recognized nuclear powers (which happen to be also the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, known as the P-5) are lauded but considered inadequate by 
abolitionists.20 Furthermore, abolitionists such as Cathleen Fisher and Barry Blechman of 
the Stimson Center assert that the health of the NPT is based on continued progress 
toward diminishing the numbers of nuclear weapons globally. They assert that as long as 
the United States continues to rely on the threat of nuclear use, its efforts to contain the 
spread of WMD will continue to appear self-serving, ~d thus eminently resistible by any 
18 Frank Blackaby, "Time for a Peasants' Revolt; Nuclear Non-proliferation," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 53, no. 6 (1997): 4. 
19 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, CA., electronic newsletter of 6/17/98, online 
database at http://www.wagingpeace.org. 
20 Canberra COmmission, The Canberra Commission on the Elimination Of Nuclear Weapons -
Part 2, (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 1996) accessed on 28 
March 1998, available from http://www.dfat.gov.auldfatlcc/cchome.html. 1. 
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country with a reason to do SO?l Abolitionists maintain that steps toward nuclear 
disarmament must be taken now to maintain the legitimacy of the NPT. If the NPT 
becomes irrelevant, abolitionists assert, nuclear proliferation efforts could increase 
considerably. 
NNWS, however, benefit from being signatories of the NPT, even if they consider 
the current system a double standard. As long as NNWS prefer a world in which they 
forego nuclear weapons i~ exchange for their regional adversaries doing the same, they 
will believe that theNPT serves their security interests.22 
An aspect of the Article VI commitment that abolitionists frequently overlook is 
the coupling of nuclear disarmament commitments with general and complete 
disarmament.23 While the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, cite 
nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal, it is not a near-term policy objective of any of 
the P-5 states. 24 The NWS argue that without multilateral efforts toward general and 
complete disarmament there is no obligation under the NPT for them to pursue a policy of 
nuclear disarmament in the near term. 
21 Cathleen Fisher and Barry Blechman, "Phase Out the Bomb," Foreign Policy (winter 1994-5): 
86. 
22 Charles L. Glaser, ''The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament," Survival 40, no. 1 (spring 
1998): 120. 
23 Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Royal United Services, Institute 
for Defense Studies, 1997),42. 
24 For the Clinton Administration view on nuclear disarmament, see Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Hearing on Nuclear Weapons 
and Deterrence, statement of Walter Slocombe, 12 February 1997. For the nuclear policy of the United 
Kingdom, see United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review, Supporting Essay Five, 
Deterrence, Arms control, and Proliferation, accessed on 3 August 1998, available from 
http://www .mod.uklpolicy/sdr/essa y05 .htrnl. 
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D. ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
A recent advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legality of nuclear weapons has been cited by abolitionists in their arguments against the 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons.25 Abolitionists do not view nuclear weapons, with their 
enormous and potentially indiscriminate destructive power, as legitimate weapons in war. 
In response to a request by the UN General Assembly for an advisory opinion on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ stated unanimously in July 1996: 
The threat or use of nuclear weapons will generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict and in particular the principles and 
rules of humanitarian law. However. .. the Court cannot conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would 
be at stake.26 
Discerning commentators have po~nted out the lack of clarity or conclusiveness in this 
statement. The court stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally 
considered illegal. However, the use of nuclear weapons would likely arise only in 
exceptional and extreme circumstances. The qualification "generally" thus deprives the 
statement of practical force. 
The Court also stated that there existed "an obligation to pursue in good faith and 
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under 
strict and effective international control.,,27, This statement adds no new obligation to 
25 Canberra Commission, pt. 1, 13. 
26 ICJ decision cited in Christopher Greenwood, "The Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and 
the Contribution of the International Court to International Humanitarian Law," International Review of the 
Red Cross, no. 316 (1 January 1997): 69. 
27 IC] Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, General 
List No. 95, p. 36 quoted in the Canberra Commission, pt. 1,6. 
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NWS. It essentially reiterates the NPT Article VI commitment to nuclear disarmament, 
which is closely linked to a program of complete and general disarmament. 
Several countries filed statements with the Court asserting that nuclear weapons 
were legal and that the question was not within the jurisdiction of the Court. Germany 
contended that the issue was a political question, not a legal one, and therefore not under 
the ICJ's jurisdiction.28 Russia filed a statement with the IC] contending that, by virtue 
of the principle of sovereignty, a "state may accomplish any acts, which are not prohibited 
under international law ... [and] intemationallaw contains no general prohibition of use 
of nuclear weapons per se.,,29 Furthermore, Russia contends that nuclear ~eapons, when 
used appropriately in the protection of the vital interests of national security, are legal and 
legitimate means of self-defense. The opinion leaves open the possibility that the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons may be lawful "in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in 
which the very survival of a state would be at stake." Although abolitionists contend that 
the IC] ruling confirms the illegality of nuclear weapons, the IC] advisory opinion avoids 
a direct judgment on that question. 
E. NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES 
Various treaties have been ratified to establish regional nuclear-weapons-free 
zones (NWFZ). Abolitionists have cited these treaties in calling for the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons. NWFZ treaties demonstrate that international support, especially in a 
regional context, exists for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaties establishing 
28 Federal Republic of Germany, "Statement for the International Court of Justice," June 1995, 1. 
29 Russian Federation, "Written Statement to the ICJ," 16 June 1995, 5. 
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NWFZs include: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (Central and South America),30 the 1986 
Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific including Australia and New Zealand), the 1996 
Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), and the 1997 Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia). 
Proponents of abolition consider the further pursuit, extension, and establishment of such 
zones significant contributions to the goal of a NWFW.31 
While the established NWFZs support the abolitionist cause, they are not always 
implemented for the sole reason of eliminating nuclear weapons within a region. For 
example, in the eyes of some of its critics, the Treaty of Raratonga was instituted partly to 
aid in the effort to remove the French from their island possessions in the South Pacific. 
Support for the treaty increased significantly after the 1995 French decision to conduct a 
final nuclear test series in the South Pacific. Additionally, advocates for the proposed 
Central Asian NWFZ aim to bolster regional autonomy and prevent Russia from claiming 
the Central Asian republics as part of a greater Russia in the future.32 
NWFZs have not been established in areas where nuclear proliferation risks are 
high, such as South Asia, the Middle East, or East Asia. Cooperative political attitudes 
have been essential to the creation of the zones. The zones themselves did not foster 
cooperative political circumstances capable of sustaining them, and they will probably 
survive only as long as relatively friendly political inter-state relations persist in the 
30 The Treaty of Tlatelolco was originally ratified in 1967. Brazil and Argentina ratified it in 1994, 
after both had decided to abandon extensive nuclear weapons programs. For a discussion of the Brazilian 
and Argentinean nuclear development programs, see Julio C. Carasales, "The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear 
Rapprochement," The Nonproliferation Review (spring/summer 1995): 39-48. 
31 Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden, ''Towards a 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World: The Need For a New Agenda," Joint Statement of9 June 1998, 6. 
32 For an in-depth discussion on NWFZs and their implications, see Zachary S. Davis, "The Spread 
Of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Building A New Nuclear Bargain" Arms Control Today (February 1996). 
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regions in question or as long as local antagonists are unable or unwilling to acquire 
nuclear arms. 
F. CURRENT CALLS FOR ABOLITION 
Several organizations advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. The more 
prominent organizations and proposals include: the Stimson Center Project, the Canberra 
Commission, the International Pugwash Movement, and the Nuclear Age Peace 
Foundation. Additionally, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has proposed 
substantial reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and examination of total elimination 
in its report.33 However, the NAS cannot, strictly speaking, be considered an abolitionist 
organization; it advocates exploring the issue of reduction to zero but has stopped short of 
an outright endorsement of abolition. Several individuals have contributed to the various 
proposals put forward by many of the abolitionist organizations, resulting in much 
common ground among the various proposals for nuclear disarmament.34 
Most abolitionists do not advocate the immediate elimination of nuclear weapons. 
The Stimson Center, for example, advocates a phased approach to eliminate nuclear 
33 The National Academy of Sciences, The Future of u.s. Nuclear Weapons Policy, accessed on 1 
July 1998, available from http://www.nap.eduJreadingroorn/books/fun/l.htrnl. 
34 For example, Steven Fetter has written extensively on verification of nuclear weapons 
elimination for the Stimson Center and the National Academy of Sciences. General Lee Butler has worked 
on committees in the Stimson Center and the Canberra Commission, and led the drive for the December 
1996 Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals. Josef Rotblat is winner of 
the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in support of abolHion and is a leading member of the Pugwash 
Movement and a contributor to th'e Canberra Commission on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. 
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weapons over several decades.35 The Canberra Commission advocates the general 
process of defining agreed targets and guidelines, which would drive the disarmament 
process toward the ultimate objective of final elimination of nuclear weapons at the 
earliest possible time.36 Abolitionists acknowledge that certain problems must be solved 
before total elimination of nuclear weapons can occur. However, they assert that steps 
can begin immediately that will start the world on the path toward the final goal of 
abolition. 
Abolitionists assert that with the end of the Cold War, a new climate of 
cooperation has been created that can be used to promote international action to eliminate 
nuclear weapons. However, they assert that action must be taken quickly or the 
opportunity will be lost.37 According to Jonathan Schell, "Gone is the murderous, 
implacable hostility between global rivals, gone the totalitarian empire; and gone the 
obstacles to inspection that have been considered the main brake on nuclear 
disarmament. ,,38 For abolitionists, the dissolution of the Cold War's East -West enmity 
has made agreement finally possible on the issues that have prevented the success of past 
nuclear disarmament efforts, including verification, international controls, and treaty 
enforcement. 
35 Michael Brown, Phased Nuclear Disarmament and US Defense Policy: Occasional Paper No. 
30 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996), accessed on 4 June 98, available from 
http://www.stimson.org/zeronuke/index.h tml. 
36 Canberra CommiSSion, pt. 2, 12. 
37 Ibid, pt. 1, 8. 
38 Jonathan Schell, The Gift of Time, The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons Now (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 1998), 10. 
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According to abolitionists, with the end of the Cold War the deployment of 
nuclear weapons is no longer justifiable in the context of the threat that exists to the P-5 
states. Abolitionists such as Robert McNamara, Carl Kaysen, and George Rathjens, 
assert that the Cold War had two chief features. The first was continued confrontation on 
the border between the two Germanys that might have broken out into war. The second 
was ideologically driven rivalries throughout the developing world, which evolved at 
various times into serious confrontations between East and West. 39 They further contend 
that the enormous build-up in nuclear weapons after 1945 was primarily a product of the 
Cold War. 40 With the threat of war between East and West gone, abolitionists believe 
that there should be a radical reduction in the arsenals of the P-5 states until the ultimate 
goal of abolition is reached. For smaller nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, 
abolitionists acknowledge that international action to resolve their security concerns may 
be necessary before disarmament in those countries can occur. 41 
Regardless of the optimism that abolitionists express about the prospects for 
international cooperation, the world is no closer now than it was during the Cold War to 
resolving such issues as verification regimes, systems for the control of atomic energy, 
and effective enforcement of a NWFW regime. The inability to create an effective 
verification regime is one of the most significant obstacles to an effective disarmament 
treaty. Enforcement against violations, as has been shown in Iraq by the UN Special 
39 Carl Kaysen, Robert McNamara, and George Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War," 
A Nuclear-Weapon Free World: Desirable? Feasible? ed. Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, and 
Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993),33. 
40 Ibid, 35. 
41 Ibid, 41. 
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Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), remains extremely problematic. Globalization and the 
opening of borders have made the control of the transportation of fissile material and the 
limitation of the diffusion of nuclear technology nearly impossible. The end of the Cold 
War has not provided solutions for all the obstacles that have historically prevented 
disarmament, nuclear or otherwise, from being a feasible endeavor. 
In fact, the world today is in many ways more dangerous and uncertain than it was 
during the Cold War. The spread of cruise and ballistic missiles and associated 
propulsion and guidance technologies42 and the spread of WMD have greatly complicated 
the threat environment faced by the United States and its allies. Additionally, the 
relatively benign relations among industrialized nations that currently exist cannot be 
expected to last indefinitely. In sum, while the nature of the threat to the United States 
has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War, significant danger remains, and 
shows no sign of abating. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The geopolitical environment after World War II was in many ways much simpler 
than it is today. The United States held a nuclear monopoly until August 1949 when the 
Soviets detonated their first bomb. A number of years passed before the Soviets 
possessed a significant atomic stockpile.43 Even in the simpler climate that existed when 
42 For the most recent and authoritative analysis of the spread of ballistic missile technology see 
The Rumsfeld COmmission, The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1998). 
43 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1981),63. 
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the United States held a nuclear monopoly, no agreement could be reached on proper 
conditions for international control of atomic energy. In today's climate of eight nuclear 
powers, and several states apparently attempting to develop nuclear weapons, any treaty 
to eliminate weapons will be much more difficult to conclude, to say nothing of the 
doubtful prospects for effective implementation of treaty provisions.44 
The Baruch Plan, the NPT, and NWFZs all represent efforts to deal with the 
danger of nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan failed because of mistrust between the 
superpowers and their unwillingness to give up the ultimate guarantor of their national 
security, nuclear weapons. These problems of mistrust between nations and associated 
security concerns remain. The NPT has been a politically prominent element of the non-
proliferation regime. While Article VI obliges the NWS to eliminate nuclear weapons, it 
does so only in the context of c0I1:tplete and general disarmament. Such disarmament is . 
not likely to occur in the foreseeable future. NWFZs have reflected the concerns of states 
in various regions regarding their desires to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
their regions. NWFZs, however, exist only in regions that face a low threat of nuclear 
proliferation. Abolition efforts during the Cold War failed because of problems regarding 
the feasibility of establishing such a regime. Today, many of these problems still exist, 
and others have emerged. Consequently, the abolition of nuclear weapons remains 
infeasible. 
44 The five declared nuclear powers are the permanent members of the UN Security Council: The 
United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. The three de Jacto nuclear powers are 
Israel, India, and Pakistan. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are among the states that have made attempts to 
develop nuclear programs and that show continuing interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
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III. ANAL YSIS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Abolitionist organizations, such as the Canberra Commission, voice three core 
reasons why nuclear disarmament is desirable. First, they argue that nuclear weapons 
have no military utility aside from the belief that they deter attack by nuclear weapons. 
To support this proposition abolitionists assert that the operational use of nuclear 
weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state would be politically and morally 
indefensible. Additionally, abolitionists argue that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons 
against other forms of·WMD is suspect. Second, abolitionists assert that the indefinite 
deployment of nuclear weapons carries with it a high risk of accidental or unauthorized 
use. Third, they suggest that the possession of nuclear weapons by some states, notably 
the P-5, stimulates other nations to acquire them, thereby fostering proliferation and 
reducing the security of al1.45 Abolitionists assert that even if the complete abolition of 
nuclear weapons is not achieved, there is a benefit in embracing the goal and taking steps' 
toward its attainment. Having the goal encourages one to take and consider steps that 
might otherwise be rejected. 
There are several faults to the arguments offered by abolitionists. First, nuclear 
weapons have utility beyond their role of deterring nuclear attack. Second, the risk of 
accidental, unauthorized, or intended use might be higher in a world with very few 
weapons or a NWFW in which one or more states might break out of the regime. Third, 
the effect of nuclear weapons arsenals upon proliferation is debatable. Nuclear weapons 
have helped to limit proliferation. For example, extended deterrence has played a 
45 Canberra Commission, pt. 1, 1. 
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significant role in stemming nuclear proliferation. Lastly, there can be little benefit 
expected in embracing a goal that is neither desirable nor feasible, especially when its 
pursuit could endanger the security of the United States. Rather, a program of verifiable 
arms control agreements rooted in the context of geopolitical realities is the wisest course 
of action available to the United States and other nuclear powers. 
There are additional reasons why nuclear disarmament is not desirable in the 
current world environment. Breakout - defined as a state hiding or developing nuclear 
weapons in violation of a disarmament treaty - could threaten the national security of the 
United States and its allies and could not be adequately guarded against. The marginal 
utility of a single nuclear weapon would skyrocket if warhead numbers approached zero, 
thus creating significant pressures for breakout and dangerous nuclear re-armament races, 
with heightened incentives to conduct pre-emptive attacks. One of the main reasons why 
the abolitionists pursue nuclear disarmament is that they believe that a world with no 
nuclear weapons would be safer and more peaceful than a world with nuclear weapons. 
This chapter suggests, however, that a NWFW might be less stable and more dangerous 
than the present nuclear environment. . 
B. ARGUMENTS FOR THE DESIRABll..ITY OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
1. Lack of Military Utility 
Abolitionists believe that nuclear weapons lack military utility. For abolitionists, 
deterring the use of an adversary's nuclear weapons is the only conceivable purpose to 
possess nuclear weapons. A general definition of deterrence is the possession of 
capabilities and the perceived will to make the threat of unacceptable retaliation credible 
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in the mind of the enemy.46 Abolitionists assert that if the sole function of nuclear 
weapons is deterrence, then there would be no need or incentive to possess them in a 
nuclear-disarmed world.47 Abolitionists argue that nuclear weapons have long been 
understood to be too destructive and non-discriminatory in nature to secure discrete 
objectives on the battlefield. Additionally, they argue that nuclear weapons use would be 
morally and politically indefensible, further limiting any military or political utility they 
may possess. Abolitionists assert that nuclear weapons have become increasingly 
regarded as weapons to be employed only in extreme situations. In such instances, 
abolitionists argue, the consequences for the initiator of a nuclear attack would be so 
grave as to obviate whatever military of political objective that prompted their use.48 
Advocates of a NWFW dispute the argument that nuclear weapons have deterred 
conventional wars. For abolitionists, whether nuclear weapons were decisive or 
superfluous to the deterring of Warsaw Pact aggression against Western Europe has been 
a matter of contention for some time. Some abolitionists, such as General Lee Butler, 
assert that nuclear weapons "intensified and prolonged an already acute ideological 
animosity.,,49 Abolitionists argue that the possession of nuclear weapons has not 
prevented conventional wars. Argentina, in its attempt to take the Falkland Islands, 
showed no fear of nuclear retaliation by Great Britain. Iraq showed no reluctance about 
46 Robert G. Joseph, "Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators," The Washington Quarterly 
(sununer 1997): 22. 
47 Rotblat, 3. 
48 Canberra COmmission, pt. 1, 5. 
49 General Lee Butler, "A Voice of Reason; Opinion About Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (15 May 1998). 
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fighting a nuclear-powered coalition in the Gulf War. Abolitionists assert that nuclear 
weapons were deemed unsuitable for use even when the Cold War superpowers suffered 
humiliating military setbacks (Korea), and even defeat (Vietnam and Afghanistan).5o 
Abolitionists dispute the ability of nuclear weapons to deter the use of other 
WMD, such as CBW. They point out that the NWS have such overwhelming strength in . 
military and civilian technology that a combination of defensive measures and advanced 
conventional forces can deter or powerfully retaliate against CBW threats. Further, 
abolitionists assert that the consequences of nuclear retaliation are so disproportionate 
and uncertain as to render such action implausible. They suggest that the most 
appropriate course for dealing with CBW threats is for the world community, especially 
the NWS, to press ahead with chemical and biological disarmament.51 
Abolitionists assert that the use of nuclear weapons would be morally 
reprehensible. The moral outrage that would be unleashed worldwide by a nuclear attack 
would outweigh any benefit a NWS might obtain through using nuclear weapons. 
Abolitionists assert that the use of nuclear weapons to kill potentially hundreds of 
millions of human beings would be an unprecedented atrocity.52 General Charles Homer, 
Allied Air Forces Commander in the Gulf War, has stated, "Nuclear weapons are such a 
gross instrument of power that they really have no utility. They ... are best used to destroy 
cities, and kill women and children .... That's morally wrong, ... [and] it doesn't make 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Schell, 12. 
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sense."S3 In short, abolitionists assert the moral implications and associated repercussions 
of using nuclear weapons limit their utility to the extent that threats of nuclear attack 
would lack credibility. For deterrence to work, a state must have credibility and 
capability. Therefore, for abolitionists, the moral implications of nuclear-weapons use, 
and the enormity of their effects, make deterrence suspect. 
Abolitionists further argue that deterrence assumes rationality in the decision-
making process, and as a result it will not affect irrational leaders. For instance, if Hitler 
had nuclear weapons in World War II, abolitionists contend, he would have used them, 
even if the allies possessed nuclear weapons of their own. Thus, in a situation where 
nuclear deterrence would be most relied upon, against an expansionist despot, it would 
likely be ineffective. 
Some abolitionists, such ~s Cathleen Fisher and Barry Blechman of the Stimson . 
Center, argue that the character of international relations "is undergoing an irreversible 
transformation that will eventually invalidate rationales for WMD."S4 They suggest that 
technology diffusion and economic interdependence have created a world where a 
growing number of states share so many common interests that "the very idea of using 
military force in the settlement of disputes has been delegitimized."ss In such a world, 
they believe, there is no need for nuclear weapons. 
53 General Charles Horner quoted in Schell, 38. 




During the Cold War, abolitionists assert, deterrence proved a highly risky and 
very expensive strategy for dealing with nuclear weapons in a world of nation-states with 
enduring, deep-seated animosities. Abolitionists argue that while deterrence may have 
introduced caution to superpower relationships during the Cold War, the argument for 
deterrence is largely circular. Its utility implies and flows from an assumption of the 
continued existence of nuclear weapons. Abolitionists assert that the need for nuclear 
deterrence would disappear in a nuclear-disarmed world.56 
Some observers question whether nuclear deterrence, including extended 
deterrence,57 was ever credible at all. According to John Mueller, the pea~e since World 
War II is more a result of the memory of the war, post-war contentment, and fear of 
escalation, than a product of caution induced by nuclear weapons. He cites the empirical 
evidence of the lack of war throughout the industrialized world since World War II, 
regardless of whether states possessed nuclear weapons.58 
Extended deterrence remains a topic of significant debate. Skeptics question 
whether the United States would ever have signed its own death warrant in the defense of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe by honoril1g extended deterrence 
commitments. A nuclear attack by the United States on the Soviet Union because of 
Warsaw Pact aggression might have led to a Soviet nuclear attack upon the United States. 
56 Canberra Commission, pt. 1,6. 
57 Extended deterrence is defined as protection gained by allies of the United States through the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States has pledged to use nuclear weapons in the defense of certain 
allies if warranted. For an in-depth analysis of extended deterrence, see Stephen Cimbala, Extended 
Deterrence; the United States and NATO Europe (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987). 
58 John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," International Security (fall 
1988). 
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Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and an 
outspoken abolitionist, doubts whether the United States, in the defense of NATO, would 
have risked nuclear attack: "I said to the President, I don't care what happens, if the 
Soviet Warsaw Pact is, in fact, overrunning West Germany, don't launch nuclear 
weapons.,,59 
The Canberra Commission has misrepresented statements by Henry Kissinger to 
support its arguments regarding the uselessness of nuclear weapons or, more specifically, 
the credibility of extended deterrence. According to the Canberra Commission, Kissinger 
stated in 1979 that he believed the United States would never initiate a nuclear strike 
against the Soviet Union to protect its allies, no matter what the provocation: "Our 
European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot 
possibly mean or, if we do mean, we should not execute because if we execute we risk the 
destruction of civilization.,,6o The Commission neglects to mention that Kissinger was 
advocating the development of more limited nuclear options, in order to re-establish the 
credibility of extended deterrence.61 That notwithstanding, it must be recognized that 
doubts about extended deterrence have long existed and are sometimes voiced by those 
who support a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent. 
Blechman and Fisher suggest that the character of international relations is 
undergoing an irreversible transformation and that the idea of using military force in the 
59 Robert McNamara quoted in Schell, 50. 
60 Henry Kissinger, "NATO Defense and the Soviet Threat," Survival (NoveinberlDecember 
1979): 266 cited in Canberra Commission, pt. 1, 10. 
61 For Kissinger's proposals regarding NATO nuclear policy see, Henry Kissinger, "The Future of 
NATO," The Washington Quarterly 2, no. 4 (autumn, 1979). 
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settlement of disputes has been delegitimized. Abolitionists assume that there is a 
general trend towards international cooperation and interdependence and that this trend 
will continue, fostering the benign political environment that would be necessary for 
nuclear disarmament to occur. It is not certain, however, that greater cooperation will 
occur in international politics. History suggests that cycles of cooperation and conflict 
have taken place, and that - even during periods characterized by high levels of 
cooperation among a majority of states - evidence of continuing rivalries has been 
present. 
During the five' years before the beginning of World War I, Norman Angell's best-
selling book, The Great Illusion, made claims eerily similar to those espoused by certain 
abolitionists about the obsolescence of war. Angell asserted that the commercial 
activities of the world were leading directly away from war. He wrote, "As this tendency 
is common to all nations .. .it necessarily means ... that the world as a whole is drifting 
away from the tendency to warfare." 62 He further asserted, "Few of us realize to what 
extent economic pressure ... has replaced physical force in human affairs.,,63 Angell's 
optimistic assertions were made at the beginning of the bloodiest century in history. 
Abolitionists assert that the only plausible utility remaining for nuclear weapons is 
that of deterring the use of nuclear weapons, and even that form of deterrence is suspect. 
For abolitionists, norms against use that have developed over the last several decades, 
combined with the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons and the moral outrage that 
62 Norman Angell, The Great fllusion (New York: G,P. Putnam's Sons, 1913),212-213. This 
book was fIrst published in November 1909 and was promptly translated and published in several 
languages. 
63 Ibid, 269, 
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would be unleashed upon a state using nuclear weapons limit the credibility of nuclear 
deterrent threats. Abolitionists assert that nuclear weapons have not prevented 
conventional wars, and nuclear weapons are not effective at deterring the use of CBW. 
2. Risk of Accidental or Unauthorized Use 
Abolitionists believe that the indefinite deployment of nuclear weapons creates a 
high risk that they will be detonated through accidental or unauthorized use. The 
Canberra Commission has written, "The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained 
in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility .... The 
only complete defense is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will 
never be produced again.,,64 For abolitionists, the world has radically changed since the 
Cold War, yet the baSIC structure of nuclear plans remains' alarmingly similar to Cold-War 
doctrine. Additionally, many mishaps and accidents involving nuclear weapons occurred 
during the Cold War. Abolitionists contend that mishaps will continue to occur, and it is 
possible that one may end in catastrophe. Abolitionists also are concerned about the 
current situation in Russia. With the deterioration of the Russian military and internal 
security infrastructure, they argue that the risk of accidental or unauthorized use in Russia 
is higher than ever. 
Abolitionists claim that the basic structure of plans for using nuclear weapons 
a:pp,ears largely unchanged from the situation during the Cold War. According to 
abolitionists, both Russia and the United States continue to emphasize early and large 
64 Canberra COmmission, pt. 1,4. 
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counter-force strikes. Both also remain capable, despite reductions in numbers and alert 
levels, of rapidly bringing their nuclear forces to full readiness.65 Consequently, 
abolitionists believe, the dangers of initiation of nuclear war by accident, through false 
warning of attack or technical failure, remain unacceptably high. 
Abolitionists assert that the deterioration of the military and internal security 
infrastructure in Russia increases the risk of accidental or unauthorized use.66 
Additionally amid the rubble of its once mighty conventional military structure, Russia is 
relying increasingly on nuclear weapons to maintain its security and position in the world. 
John Steinbrunner, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, has 
noted that Russia has lost segments of the Soviet-era early warning network, and Russia's 
strategic forces are not able to withstand pre-emptive or preventive attack. He further 
states that Russia will increase the alert rates of its nuclear forces in response to NATO 
expansion and conventional force operations. This cannot be done without accepting 
safety standards lower than a less reactive force could aChieve.67 For abolitionists, the 
problems in the Russian nuclear system could lead to disaster through accidental 
detonation of a nuclear weapon, making a NWFW all the more pressing and urgent. 
The continued practice of maintaining nuclear weapons systems on high states of 
alert increases the danger of accidental detonation, according to abolitionists. The 
avoidance of a major catastrophe over five decades is a credit to those that managed and 
1997). 
65 National Academy of Sciences, 2. 
66 Ibid. 
67 John Steinbrunner, "Russia Faces an Unsafe Reliance on Nukes," Los Angeles Times (3 March 
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maintained the weapon systems, but accidents did occur. Advocates of a NWFW assert 
that between 1945 and 1980, approximately 100 accidents were reported, which damaged 
nuclear weapons and risked unintended detonation.68 Abolitionists assert that it is likely 
that there were at least as many serious, unreported accidents, especially in the totalitarian 
communist regimes that maintained nuclear weapons. Further, abolitionists argue that it 
should not be presumed that an accidental detonation could be differentiated from an 
actual attack. An accident might appear to be a nuclear attack upon a missile field. 
Abolitionists question whether "retaliation" would then occur, possibly igniting a nuclear 
war. 
There are alternatives to outright abolition that stop short of complete elimination 
of nuclear arsenals. Individuals such as Bruce Blair have advocated universal de-alerting 
of nuclear weapons. He asserts th~l.t this would make safety the primary consideration in . 
nuclear policy, which would more appropriately reflect the geopolitical environment than 
current nuclear alert postures.69 Many abolitionists would support universal de-alerting. 
However, they would consider it only a step toward complete disarmament; it could not 
be accepted as a substitute. For abolitionists, de-alerted nuclear arsenals still generate the 
risk that nuclear weapons will one day be used. 
68 Schell, 12. 
69 Bruce Blair, Global Zero Alert/or Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1995), 10. 
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3. The Proliferation Effect of Nuclear Arsenals 
Abolitionists assert that the possession of nuclear weapons by some states 
stimulates nuclear proliferation by others, reducing the security of all.?O Abolitionists 
believe that current double standard of the NPT is untenable. Additionally, they assert 
that a NWFW would delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons, thereby eliminating 
prestige as a factor pushing states to proliferate. In a NWFW, nuclear deterrence would 
be eliminated as.ajustification to proliferate. In short, the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons would greatly reduce the incentives for NNWS to develop their own nuclear 
weapons, according to abolitionists. 
Abolitionists assert that no legal or moral argument can justify possession of 
nuclear weapons by some states while denying nuclear weapons to others. Furthermore, 
they assert that the existence of the nuclear weapons industry will facilitate the 
technology transfer that will fuel proliferation.?1 Fisher and Blechman assert that unless 
the NWS take meaningful efforts to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, 
the treaty may lose any influence to limit proliferation. They argue that, while the East-
West competition offered some justification for the "dual-stand~d" inherent in the NPT, 
with the end of the Cold War the costs of the two-tier system increasingly outweigh its 
benefits.72 For abolitionists, as long as the United States continues to rely on the threat of 
nuclear use, its efforts to contain the spread of WMD will continue to appear self-serving 
70 Canberra COmmission, pt. 1, 1. 
71 Jack Steinberger, Essam Galal, and Mikhail Milstein, "A Nuclear Weapon Free World: Is It 
Desirable? Is It Necessary?" A Nuclear-Weapon Free World: Desirable? Feasible? ed. Joseph Rotblat, 
Jack Steinberger, and Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993),59. 
72 Blechman and Fisher, 86. 
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and insincere, and thus easily resisted by any country desiring to do so. For abolitionists, 
the health of the NPT is based on continued progress in diminishing the size of nuclear 
weapons. Without such progress, abolitionists argue, proliferation pressures could 
significantly increase. 
The perceived need for a deterrent nuclear force has caused some states to acquire 
nuclear weapons, according to abolitionists. For example, once China obtained nuclear 
weapons, India felt the need to develop nuclear weapons to maintain its national security. 
Once India was known to have nuclear weapons, Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were-
heightened.73 Abolitionists argue that this vicious proliferation circle can be eliminated 
with a NWFW, where there would be no need to deter against nuclear attack. 
Abolitionists argue that the maintenance of nuclear weapons by a few, powerful 
states - notably the P-5 - fosters a nuclear culture and sends the message that nuclear 
weapons confer prestige and respect upon the nations that own them. Prestige has been a 
factor in the decision by many states to develop nuclear weapons. Britain's decision to 
acquire its own nuclear weapons stemmed from the desire to continue to "eat at the top 
table" by participating in alliance, particularly nuclear, decision-making as an equal.74 
Additionally, the French have long viewed nuclear weapons as a symbol of independence, 
particularly from the United States_ Abolitionists assert that, if nothing else, nuclear 
weapons cast a state in a different light in the international community. Many third world 
despots clamor for the respect they believe nuclear weapons would bestow upon them. 
Muammar Qaddafi has said, "We should be like the Chinese - poor and riding donkeys, 
73 Kaysen, MacNamara, and Rathjens, 37. 
74 Harold Macmillan, quoted in Kaysen, McNamara, and Rathjens, 36. 
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but respected and possessing an atom bomb.,,75 In short, prestige is a factor that has 
contributed to the decision of many states to proliferate, or attempt to proliferate. It is not 
certain that it could be eliminated, even in a disarmed world. 
The delegitimization of nuclear weapons would further aid in the enforcement of a . 
NWFW, according to abolitionists. Gen. Charles Homer argues, "We have to create an 
environment in which not having nuclear weapons puts you in a position of strength, not 
weakness .... It should become a commonly held belief that it is dysfunctional for any 
one nation to have them, so that you release the force of moral outrage, in addition to self-
interest" to enforce a NWFW regime.76 Thus, abolitionists argue that the 
delegitimization of nuclear weapons that would occur in a NWFW would embolden the 
international community to take action against anyone attempting break out of the regime. 
Abolitionists are alarmed by the proliferation of nuclear fissile material. The 
Canberra Commission has written that loose accounting and control have been a major 
factor in "the development of an already significant illegal trade in fissile material, 
particularly from sites in the former Soviet Union.'.77 For abolitionists, this trade will only 
make it easier for terrorist or sub-state groups· to obtain enough material for a nuclear 
device. Abolitionists assert that the extremely tight controls upon fissile material, which 
would characterize a NWFW regime, would deal with this growing problem. 
75 Muammar Qadaffi in 1987, quoted in Robert A. Manning, "The Nuclear Age: The Next 
Chapter," Foreign Policy (Dec 22, 1997): 70. 
76 General Charles Horner, Allied Air Forces Commander in the Gulf War, quoted in Schell, 39. 
77 Canberra Commission, pt. 1,6. 
34 
C. FLAWS IN THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE DESIRABILITY OF 
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
An essential element in the abolitionist argument is that nuclear weapons have no 
role outside of deterring the use of nuclear weapons. This assertion is incorrect. Nuclear 
weapons have been used for a variety of purposes besides deterring the use of nuclear 
weapons. A NWFW likely would not be sustainable if there were compelling uses for 
nuclear weapons outside of this role. The assertion that a NWFW would be safer than a 
world with nuclear weapons overlooks the potential instabilities and dangers that could 
present themselves in a disarmed world, such as the danger of re-armament races under 
crisis conditions. The assertion that proliferation is fostered by the possession of nuclear 
weapons by some states also overlooks the huge incentives for nuclear proliferation that 
would exist in a world with few, or no, nuclear weapons. Additionally, it ignores the role 
that nuclear weapons have played in limiting proliferation. 
1. The Utility of Nuclear Weapons 
Abolitionists believe that there is no role for nuclear weapons other than nuclear 
deterrence. It is unlikely that NWS wo.uld agree to disarm if they still perceived 
significant utility from nuclear weapons outside that of deterring the use of nuclear 
weapons. The argument that this form of deterrence is the sole reason for nuclear 
weapons is logically impeccable, given its assumptions. If deterrence were the only 
function of nuclear weapons, there would be no need to possess them in a NWFW. The 
problem with the argument is that its premise is false: nuclear weapons have been used 
for a variety of purposes beyond deterrence. A short list of uses for nuclear weapons 
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would include deterring the employment of other types ofWMD (chemical and biological 
weapons), deterring conventional wars, gaining prestige, exerting political leverage, 
destroying deeply buried targets, and promoting non-proliferation through extended 
deterrence. 
Abolitionists assert that one of the reasons that nuclear weapons have no military 
utility is that their use would be morally reprehensible. The moral outrage unleashed by a 
nuclear attack would make such use counterproductive. Abolitionists assert that the use 
of nuclear weapons to kill potentially hundreds of millions of human beings would be an 
unprecedented atrocity. However, many factors must be considered in determining 
whether any specific use of force (including any type of WMD) is morally and politically 
defensible. The use of nuclear weapons to prevent aggression, or to retaliate against it, is 
defensible both politicaIly and morally. on a prima facie basis. Robert Je~is has noted . 
that "arguments about morality are difficult to separate from arguments about empirical 
questions.,,78 It is possible that general war between the superpowers was avoided in the 
Cold War because of each side's nuclear weapons. Additionally, Israelis may believe that 
the threat posed by their nuclear weapons has prevented attacks that might have 
threatened their existence. One cannot label nuclear weapons, per se, as immoral. As 
with any weapon, the ways in which the weapon would be used - not the weapon itself -
would enable one to classify the morality of that use. 
The Gulf War was a case in which nuclear weapons possibly deterred the use of 
chemical and biological weapons. Despite Saddam Hussein's well-documented use of 
78 Jervis, 124. 
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chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War, he never used 
such weapons against the United States or Israel during the Gulf War. During Operation 
Desert Shield, the United States signaled to Iraq that WMD use would be met with 
overwhelming retaliation. On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State Baker made a 
purposefully blunt point to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Secretary Baker 
said, "If the conflict involves your use of chemical or biological weapons against our 
forces, the American people will demand vengeance. We have the means to extract it.,,79 
After the war, Iraqi officials declared that Saddam Hussein was deterred from using 
WMD because U.S. warnings were interpreted as threats of nuclear retali~tion.8o 
Several senior U.S. officials have stated and written that the United States would 
never actually have employed nuclear weapons.81 This would tend to bolster abolitionist 
claims that nuclear weapons have no utility in countering other WMD. Yet, what was 
important for deterrence was what Saddam Hussein believed. Without the American or 
Israeli nuclear arsenal, he would not have had a reason to fear a nuclear attack in 
retaliation for CBW use. Additionally, while Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has 
stated that nuclear weapons use was never seriously considereq, he also noted that had 
CBW been used against coalition forces, a nuclear response might have been 
considered.82 
79 James A. Baker III, Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995),359, cited in 
Keith Payne, Post-Cold War Requirements for u.s. Nuclear Deterrence Policy (Fairfax, VA: National 
Institute for Public Policy, March 1998), 14. 
80 Payne, Post-Cold War Requirementsfor U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy, 14. 
81 Robert G. Joseph, ''Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators," The Washington Quarterly 
(summer 1997), 170. 
82 Ibid. 
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The Cold War demonstrated that nuclear weapons are effective at least in 
instilling caution among nuclear powers, limiting conflicts that could have progressed to 
full-scale conventional, or even nuclear, war. Some believe that the fear of non-nuclear 
total war would still have been sufficient to prevent a Third World War (although similar 
arguments were made after 1918, reinforced by the prospect of poisoned gas being used 
against cities). What is quite implausible is to extract nuclear weapons from 
contemporary European, Asian and Middle Eastern history and to assert that everything 
else would have been the same.83 The fear of nuclear war probably made at least some 
contribution to the historically remarkable absence of war between major powers during 
an awkward and abrasive half-century.84 
Although the abolitionist movement is an international movement, its primary 
arguments seem to be peculiarly American-centric. Countries such as Russia, China, 
France, and Israel continue to maintain their arsenals for reasons different from 
America's primary rationale of deterrence. Americans may no longer see any value in 
maintaining nuclear forces to make up for conventional disadvantages because the 
conventional balance has shifted in their direction. However, Russia relies upon its 
nuclear weapons more than ever because of the disastrous state of its conventional 
military forces. Russians are reeling from profound internal upheaval, and are conscious 
of wide instability along their borders. Consequently, Russia has been reshaping defense 
83 Lawrence Freedman, "From Marginalisation to Elimination?" Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 
187. 
84 Quinlan, 60. 
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doctrine in ways that tend to put more emphasis on nuclear weapons.85 For example, 
statements by the Russian Defense Ministry indicate that in 1993 Russia backed away 
from the 1982 Sovietno-first-use pledge. Furthermore, Russia's nuclear arsenal 
constitutes the one unmistakable claim Russia now has to Great Power status. It is 
unrealistic to expect that any Russian leader would be interested in abandoning the 
security and political importance that nuclear-weapon status confers.86 
Israel is not a declared nuclear power, but it possesses possibly hundreds of 
nuclear weapons. Israel derives many benefits from its nuclear arsenal. David Ben· 
Gurion seems to have'urged the development of a nuclear arsenal as part of the state's 
efforts to acquire a qualitative edge over its quantitatively superior Arab adversaries.87 
Nuclear weapons provide Israel with deterrence against conventional attack and against 
other foims of WMD. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate security guarantee for the 
Israeli state. Israel will almost certainly not abandon this guarantee, regardless of whether 
other states elect to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. 
France has made a huge investment of political capital, scientific effort, and 
financial resources in building a nuclear capability. The Erench are proud of their nuclear 
weapons, as demonstrated in the controversial episode of the final nuclear test series in 
the South Pacific.88 Prestige seems one of the main benefits that France receives from its 
nuclear weapons. It is possible that in a NWFW, nuclear weapons would be 
85 Ibid, 62. 
86 Ibid, 63. 
87 Shai Feldman, "Nuclear Weapons in Israel's Security Policy," Nuclear Weapons and Arms 
Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 19~7), 95. 
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delegitimized to the extent that any prestige in owning them would cease to exist. Still, 
France is a modem, Western, industrial country that believes its nuclear arsenal conveys a 
degree of prestige and influence it would not otherwise possess. It is unlikely to support 
any efforts toward near-term comprehensive nuclear disarmament. 
Russia, France, and Israel use their nuclear arsenals for a variety of purposes. In a 
NWFW, incentives would remain that might encourage a country to violate the regime 
and build its own arsenal. A monopolist nuclear power or a state locked in total war with 
a non-nuclear rival might find many uses for nuclear weapons.89 States use nuclear 
weapons for more than just nuclear deterrence. It is unlikely that they will give up their 
nuclear arsenals for the nebulous benefits of a NWFW. 
2. The Safety of Nuclear Arsenals 
Abolitionists are concerned about accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear 
device. They also believe that nuclear weapons eventually will be used. Abolitionists 
overlook the fact, however, that measures short of disarmament could greatly reduce the 
risk of a nuclear accident. The danger of nuclear accidents or unauthorized use in a 
NWFW could be worse than today. Additionally, abolitionists overlook the heightened 
possibility of purposeful use at very low numbers of nuclear weapons, because fear of 
severe retaliation would no longer instill caution among decision-makers. 
Abolitionists overlook that fact that many of the problems they address have 
attracted considerable attention. The problem is not ignorance of the risks of nuclear 
89 Freedman, "From Marginalisation to Elimination?" 188. 
40 
accident, but of how best to reduce them.90 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 
for example, is an attempt to help Russia keep its arsenal secure. In the United States, 
policies such as the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the removal of all nuclear 
weapons from surface ships, attack submarines, the U.S. Anny, and the U.S. Marines 
have greatly reduced the risk of nuclear accidents.91 Furthermore, the alert rates of some . 
U.S. and Russian nuclear forces have been reduced since the Cold War. 
It is possible that disarmament could increase the probability of accidental and 
unauthorized use. If disarmament broke down and a rearmament race ensued, states 
would not likely give priority to the inclusion of safety mechanisms in their new nuclear 
weapons or to recreating an effective command and control system. Consequently, the 
arsenals of rearming states could be more susceptible to unintentional use than today's 
nuclear forces. 
Abolitionists overlook the heightened possibility of purposeful use in a NWFW 
regime. Janne E. Nolan notes in one of the background papers prepared for the Canberra 
Commission, "A realistic strategy for nuclear elimination must contend with the 
perception that the potential for global and regional military instability could be highest 
during a period of tr~sition to very small numbers of nuclear weapons.,,92 Additionally, 
the danger posed by re-armament races in a crisis environment could be much greater 
90 Ibid, 186. 
91 Slocombe, "Is There a Role for Nuclear Deterrence?" NATO Review (November/December 
1997): 25. 
92 Janne E. Nolan, "Global and Regional Security in the Transitional Period," Report of the 
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than any current risk of deliberate use.93 If relations sour following disarmament, then 
states could attempt to rearm. Nuclear war could be more likely during an unstable 
rearmament phase, which might lack the restraining effect of deterrence, than in a mature 
nuclear world. Consequently, disarmament could increase the probability of deliberate 
nuclear war. 
Many factors could cause a nuclear re-armament race to be extremely dangerous. 
The race may show that the disarmament regime was poorly designed, allowing one state 
to gain a nuclear monopoly. The nuclear state might then use its nuclear advantage to 
compel the end of a conventional war, to destroy the adversary's military advantage, or to 
destroy the adversary's nuclear-rearmament capability. Alternatively, the rearmament 
race might produce uncertainty about the status of nuclear capabilities. A state, 
mistakenly believing that it had a monopoly, might use nuclear weapons only to learn that 
its adversary had also been able to rebuild its WMD quickly. Once rearinament begins, 
the best scenario is that all countries will be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the 
redeployment of nuclear weapons or the promise of forthcoming deployments by others, 
thus returning safely to a nuclear world.94 
On balance, the safety benefits of moving toward radically lowered levels of 
nuclear weapons - or hypothetically, zero nuclear weapons - must be weighed against the 
security benefits that we continue to derive from nuclear deterrence.95 This is especially 
93 Glaser, 113. 
94 Ibid, 115. 
95 Congress, Senate, Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation 
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true when one considers the potentially unsafe practices that could result from breakout 
and subsequent rearmament races. While abolitionists argue that people are incapable of 
avoiding accidental or unauthorized detonation with the indefinite deployment of nuclear 
weapons, they believe that people can accomplish the equally challenging task of 
eliminating all nuclear weapons and verifying and ensuring compliance with a NWFW 
regime. 
3. The Roles of Nuclear Weapons in Inhibiting Proliferation 
Abolitionists state that the possession of nuclear arsenals by some states 
stimulates proliferation by others, reducing the security of all. A more compelling case 
would be that proliferant states acquire nuclear weapons not because others have them but 
primarily for other reasons - to counter regional adversaries, to further regional 
ambitions, and to enhance their status among their neighbors.96 Addition~lly, nuclear 
weapons have other affects that tend to inhibit proliferation. Extended deterrence has 
strongly inhibited many Asian and European allies of the United States, who possess the 
technological capability to acquire nuclear weapons, from building their own nuclear 
arsenals. In a NWFW, enormous proliferation pressure could develop. The marginal 
utility of a single weapon would skyrocket in a NWFW, providing significant incentive 
for states to develop their own nuclear arsenals. 
The assertion that nuclear arsenals of some states beget proliferation by others is a 
generalization that does not adequately account for all the incentives leading a state to 
96 Walter Slocombe, "Is There Stin a Role for Nuclear Deterrence?" 25. 
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proliferate. Brent Scowcroft notes that, "Aspiring nuclear nations seek nuclear weapons 
because of their own pressing security concerns, not because of concern over nuclear 
balance of power. ,,97 Pakistan is a case in point. The loss of East Pakistan after the 1971 
Bangladesh war combined with the belief that Pakistani military capabilities were 
overpowered by the Indian military led President ZulfIkar Ali Bhutto to order the 
Pakistani scientifIc community to begin developing nuclear arms. Bhutto believed a 
Pakistani nuclear weapon capability would increase Pakistan's security. India's 1974 test 
did not cause, but rather increased Pakistan's nuclear resolve.98 
Extended deterrence has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many allies 
of the United States that currently benefIt from U.S. extended deterrence could have 
developed their own nuclear arsenals. Countries such as South Korea, Japan, Germany, 
and Turkey have had signifIcant security concerns that could have prompted them to 
develop nuclear weapons. Many countries currently under the U.S. nuclear umbrella still 
perceive a strong threat to their national security. Until those threats disappear, reasons to 
possess or seek access to nuclear weapons will remain. Removal of the U.S. nuclear 
guarantees could potentially push these states to develop their o~n nuclear capability. 
Thus, significant improvements in the international security environment would be 
required before a NWFW could be considered feasible. 
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Another factor affecting proliferation in a NWFW is that the marginal utility of a 
single weapon could skyrocket if warhead numbers approached zero. As James 
Schlesinger, U.S. Secretary of Defense under President Nixon, noted, "The smaller [the 
number] of nuclear weapons the greater is the premium for having just a few.,,99 In 
today's environment, a state faces the daunting challenge of mobilizing substantial 
financial and technical resources to support a clandestine nuclear program. The handful 
of weapons that might result from such a venture would be dwarfed by thousands of 
superior U.S. nuclear weapons and thousands more held by other NWS. In a NWFW, 
however, a mere handful of crude weapons would be perceived as an arsenal bestowing 
Great Power status. 100 
If a country with the capability to develop nuclear weapons found itself in a war in 
which its very existence was threatened, it would be compelled to consider developing 
nuclear weapons. The result could be dangerous re-armament races under crisis 
conditions. Unless anarchy no longer characterized international relations, there would 
be incentives for states to re-arm in a NWFW. Until such changes occurred, making war 
no longer possible, it is doubtful that an abolitionist regime could be sustainable. 
Abolitionists assert that if a nation were to break out of a NWFW regime, it could 
face the combined military and economic retribution of the world. According to Gen. 
Charles Homer, "ten nuclear weapons are not going to destroy the United States, Russia, 
99 PBS's The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer (1996), quoted in Schell, 33. 
100 Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Security, PrOliferation, and Federal Services, 
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or China. It's going to provoke a very serious response from those nations if they are 
nuclear-free. Their outrage would be such that nobody would dare whip back the 
curtain."IOI However, why should the United States undermine its national security by 
disarming and allowing itself to be threatened by a nuclear adversary? Considering the 
herculean effort that was required to build the coalition against Saddam Hussein in the 
Gulf War, economically or militarily dismantling a country is not as easy as Homer 
implies. In a NWFW, it would not be easy, or necessarily wise, for the United States to 
sacrifice potentially hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a war fought for non-
proliferation. Such sacrifice seems especially unlikely when one considers that the most 
effective response to such a problem could be the reconstitution of a nuclear arsenal. 
Some abolitionists concede this point. Blechman and Fisher have written, "If American 
citizens have been reluctant to support interventions in relatively benign military 
environments like Haiti, how much more reluctant will they be when U.S. forces face a 
real threat of attack by nuclear weapons?"I02 Relying on an international effort to disarm 
a breakout nation in a NWFW is a dangerous premise on which to base the desirability or 
feasibility of disarmament. 
Disarmament is self-defeating because it would lead ultimately to proliferation. 
Even supposing disarmament could be achieved, it would not likely survive a severe 
crisis or a major war. A crisis would be the true test of disarmament, because nuclear war 
101 Gen Charles Horner quoted in Schell, 40. 
102 Blechman and Fisher, 6. 
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is unlikely to occur during peacetime. As political conditions deteriorate, disarmament 
would probably collapse into a rearmament race.103 
4. The Infeasibility of Nuclear Disarmament 
Despite significant uncertainty about whether the course they recommend will 
prove feasible, abolitionists urge us to undertake a serious commitment to eliminating 
nuclear weapons. Richard Perle has said, "I should have thought that embarking on a 
policy the feasibility of which cannot be shown is a most doubtful and risky way to shape 
our future security.,,104 Assuming disarmament could be attained, verification of an 
abolition agreement could never be rigorous enough to guarantee against breakout. 
Although nuclear weapons may be destroyed, the knowledge of how to build them will 
remain. 
The United States has no incentive to place itself in grave peril by disarming in a 
world where other countries could retain a few weapons, or quickly reconstitute a nuclear 
force. Perle has stated that "every state able to do so would cheat. But we - perhaps 
alone - would not. . .. The actual, real world result would be the unilateral nuclear 
disarmament of the United States.,,105 Unilateral disarmament would undermine national 
security to a greater degree than any present risk of accidental, unauthorized, or 
purposeful use of nuclear weapons. 
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Abolitionists concede that "the elimination of nuclear weapons will not be 
possible without the development of adequate verification."lo6 They assert that the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons is a process that will likely take place over the course of 
twenty to thirty years, and will generate much controversy. Abolitionists maintain, 
however, that an effective verification regime is possible. Until fissile material can be 
detected with a high degree of certainty at great distances and through thick protective 
barriers, however, no adequate verification regime is possible. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The abolitionists advance three main reasons to support the desirability of nuclear 
disarmament: nuclear weapons lack utility; the risk of accidental or unauthorized use is 
unacceptably high; and the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries fosters 
proliferation. Each element of this argument is flawed. Nuclear weapons can be used for 
many purposes, including deterrence of chemical, biological, or conventional aggression. 
As long as NWS perceive benefits from nuclear weapons outside of nuclear deterrence, a 
NWFW is not attainable. In examining the risk of accidental or unauthorized use, 
abolitionists overlook the fact that severe reductions in nuclear arsenals might minimize 
or eliminate nuclear deterrence, creating greater incentives to conduct pre-emptive or 
preventive attacks. Additionally, a nuclear re-armament race resulting from a crisis in a 
NWFW would be an extremely dangerous situation with a high risk of purposeful or 
accidental use of nuclear weapons. In assessing the negative impact of nuclear arsenals 
upon proliferation, abolitionists examine only one element of the debate, discounting 
106 Canberra Conunission, pt. 1, 16. 
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those factors of nuclear arsenals that inhibit proliferation. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the 
abolitionist arguments for a NWFW is they overlook the fact that as numbers 
approached zero the marginal utility of a single weapon would skyrocket. Significant 
proliferation pressure would result, likely reversing any progress toward disarmament that 
had been made to that point. 
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IV: THE FEASffiILITY OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
The European waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties 
eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be placed in a 
waste-paper basket is a poor thing on which to hang our national 
sajety.107 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the main arguments for the feasibility of eliminating nuclear 
weapons. Specifically, the Stimson Center's plan for phased nuclear disarmament is 
examined. For nuclear disarmament to be successful, a reliable verification regime with 
unprecedented authority would be necessary. Equally important, however, would be the 
level of transparency and trust that would permeate the international environment. Many 
problems make nuclear disarmament infeasible in the near term. The Baruch Plan failed 
because of the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree on verification 
and enforcement measures. These issues remain among the chief reasons why nuclear 
disarmament is not possible in the near future. 
Each group advocating abolition has its own distinctive attributes, conclusions, 
and recommendations. However, the broad themes in nuclear disarmament proposals and 
associated verification regimes are similar. The phased approach proposed by Michael 
Brown of the Stimson Center is the case in point analyzed in this chapter. 108 It is 
. representative of other proposals, and it asserts that it does not mandate a radical 
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transformation of the world political environment. For Brown, complete nuclear 
disarmament should be achieved in four distinct phases. Each phase has a goal for total 
number of nuclear weapons in anyone country: 2,000 in Phase I, several hundred in 
Phase II, dozens in Phase ill, and complete elimination by the end of Phase IV. 
The Canberra Commission does not define a precise timeframe for the elimination 
of nuclear weapons. It recognizes the importance of establishing the necessary 
confidence in the verification regime that would be required to take the final step to 
complete elimination of nuclear we~pons. The Canberra Commission advocates a 
general process of defining agreed targets and guidelines, which would lead to the 
ultimate objective of final elimination of nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible time.109 
The Canberra Commission Report is broadly in agreement with the Stimson Center's plan 
for phased reduction and advocates measures such as control of fissile materials, 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and no-first-use pledges. 
The National Academy of Sciences also has proposed a plan for phased nuclear 
reductions. However, this proposal aims only to draw down arsenals to a few hundred 
weapons per country and then to assess the possibilities for further reductions and 
possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. 110 A limit of a few hundred weapons 
corresponds to Phase II of Brown's plan. 
109 Canberra COmmission, pt. 2, 12. 
110 National Academy of Sciences, 7. 
52 
B. THE ABOLITIONIST PLAN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
1. Phase I 
Abolitionists assert that Phase I would be comparatively easy to bring about and 
would require minimal changes to current U.S. defense policy. Fundamental changes to 
the nuclear triad, for example, would not be required.11l In Phase I, which abolitionists 
assert could begin immediately, strategic nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia 
would be reduced via the third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) to 2,000 in 
each country. Bans would be initiated on nuclear testing and the production of fissile 
material. No-first-use policies would be declared. Abolitionists argue that the United 
States would still possess overwhelming nuclear forces capable of providing roughly the 
same level of deterrence that current forces provide. Additionally, they argue that 
conventional forces would not be significantly affected by such reductions. 
A problem with Phase I is that it does not adequately address Russia's current 
situation. Phase I assumes the completion of START ill reductions when it is not certain 
START II will ever be approved by the Russian Duma. Russia's increasing reliance upon 
nuclear weapons would be a major obstacle that any disarmament plan would have to 
overcome. Additionally, it is possible that a NWS in the future, facing problems similar 
to those of Russia today, would not desire to adhere to a nuclear disarmament agreement. 
Forcibly denuclearizing an established nuclear power is an issue that is not addressed by 
abolitionists. This is likely because there could be no nuclear disarmament without full 
compliance and cooperation by all NWS. 
111 Brown, 2. 
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2. Phase II 
In Phase II, abolitionists propose to reduce nuclear weapons to no more than 
several hundred weapons in any NWS. Implementation of this phase would be much 
more challenging than Phase I, because it would involve at least five nuclear powers.1I2 
Brown does not address whether non-declared nuclear powers such ·as Israel or the states 
that have recently demonstrated that they are NWS (e.g., India and Pakistan) would be 
involved in the negotiations for Phase II implementation. It is highly unlikely, however, 
that the NWS would be willing to draw down to hundreds of weapons while states like 
India, Pakistan, and Israel would be unaffected by Phase II agreements. 
Brown contends that Phase II reduction would not pose significant or serious 
problems for extended deterrence: "Threats to U.S. allies would probably be few, allied 
conventional forces would presumably continue to be robust, and the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
would still be in place as a backstop against aggression by a nuclear power.,,1l3 Again, 
Russia is overlooked as a potential threat to U.S. allies in Europe - to say nothing of 
China as a possible menace to U.S. allies in Asia. 
Phase II would involve major changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine. The nuclear triad 
probably would have to be jettisoned, and the current policy of extended deterrence 
would require significant revision to maintain credibility. Current U.S. force levels in 
Europe, for . 
112 Ibid, 20. 
113 Ibid, 22. 
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example, range from 480 to 700 gravity bombs.114 Severe reductions, or elimination, of 
nuclear weapons in Europe would be required for the United States to reduce its total 
arsenal to the Phase n ceiling of several hundred weapons. Historically, U.S. allies have 
valued highly the physical presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Without actual 
weapons on the ground, U.S. pledges to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe might lack 
credibility.115 
With only a few hundred weapons in the arsenal, there would be a significant 
redistribution of assets and a corresponding change in strategy. Basing their analysis on a 
distorted picture of U.S. strategic nuclear policy, abolitionists maintain that what they 
describe as a historic emphasis on pre-emption, launch-on-warning, and prompt 
retaliation would have to be replaced by a commitment to riding out attacks and to 
delayed responses. 116 Abolitionists reason, however, that "one does not need 'assured 
destruction' capabilities ... unless one is dealing with a totalitarian power bent on 
aggression and conquest.,,117 Ultimately, abolitionists contend, a capability to conduct a 
114 David S. Yost, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Prospects and PriOrities, Future Roles Series 
Paper #7 (Livermore, CA: Sandia National Laboratories Defense Programs, 1996), 3. For the estimate of 
700 weapons Yost cites: Alan Riding, "NATO Will Cut Atom Weapons for Aircraft Use," New York 
Times, 18 October 1991, Al. For the estimate of 480 he cites Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, 
"U.S. Nuclear Weapon Locations, 1995," Bulletin o/the Atomic Scientists (NovemberJDecember 1995): 
74-75. 
115 Ibid, 2. 
116 Brown, 18. Brown seems here to mischaracterize U.S. nuclear policy, which does not rely on 
concepts such as pre-emption and launch-on-warning. 
117 Ibid, 19. 
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retaliatory strike consisting of a few dozen weapons would be sufficient to deter potential 
aggressors from "international adventurism."u8 
Achieving agreement on Phase IT limits and on procedures to reach such limits 
would be difficult. Concurrent with Phase IT reductions would be attempts to shape the 
political environment so that further reductions, as envisioned by abolitionists under 
Phase ill, would be possible. Without a very cooperative and benign environment, fear 
could exist that one country would retain numbers of weapons beyond the limits of the 
phased reduction. Thus, arriving at such low levels would be much more challenging 
than abolitionists acknowledge. 
A central requirement for the success of Phase IT implementation would be an 
adequate verification regime. Among other issues, verifying the accuracy of declared 
stocks of warheads and fissile materials - and ensuring that no warheads or fissile 
materials had been concealed - would be crucial and difficult aspects of disarmament. 1 19 
Verification thus assumes significant and increasing importance from Phase IT onward. 
Verification problems are addressed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
JI8 lbid. 
119 Canberra Commission, Annex A, 2. 
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3. Phase TIl 
A primary requirement for initiation of Phase ill would be "relatively benign 
political relations among the major powers.,,120 Phase ill reductions call for no more than 
several dozen weapons in any state. All known or suspected nuclear states would have to 
be involved in·Phase ill negotiations. The non-proliferation regime would have to be 
strong and dependable by then. Questions remaining about the number of nuclear 
weapons and the amount of weapons-grade fissile material produced worldwide would 
have to be resolved. Michael Browp. of the Stimson Center claims that any changes 
required of U.S. defense policy in Phase ill would already have been dealt with in Phase 
II. Nonproliferation and verification regimes would be essential to successful reductions 
in Phase ill. 
Despite the Stimson Center's requirement for a plan that would be effective in 
both benign political environments as well as contentious or adversarial environments, 
Phase ill is explicitly dependent upon "relatively benign political relations among the 
superpowers." With allowances for no more than several dozen weapons per nation, it is 
difficult to imagine a nation allowing an adversary, or an ally of an adversary, unhindered 
access to its most valuable and sensitive defense sites. For example, it is unlikely that 
India would allow Pakistan or China unrestricted access to its reactor facilities, weapons 
storage areas, and research laboratories. The South Asian situation is hardly unique in 
being greatly complicated by domestic politics, security concerns, and prestige factors. It 
120 Brown, 23. 
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should be expected that such factors would assert themselves and interfere with the 
establishment of a NWFW regime. 
4. Phase IV 
Abolitionists acknowledge that complete nuclear disarmament would have to 
involve extraordinarily stringent non-proliferation and verification regimes and 
safeguards. This would require infringements upon state sovereignty that many states 
would find objectionable.l21 It would also require a fundamental shift in U.S. defense 
policy. The United States would have to abandon its commitments to protect allies With 
extended deterrence. Nuclear deterrence would cease to be an element of defense strategy 
for any nuclear power. 
In addition to the shift in defense policy required away from the U.S. triad in 
Phase II, the most challenging phases of nuclear disarmament would lie in Phases ill and 
IV. Built into the program for phased reductions would be implicit requirements for 
states to surrender aspects of sovereignty to provide for effective verification. 
In analyzing the prospects for phased disarmament, abolitionist organizations such 
as the Stimson Center acknowledge that one must consider both benign scenarios in 
which political relations among the great powers are good and less benign scenarios in 
which relations among the great powers are contentious or adversarial. 122 Abolitionists 
contend that even in an antagonistic climate, reduction to zero nuclear weapons would be 
121 Ibid, 27. 
122 Ibid, 4. 
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possible. However, abolitionists do not adequately address what actions would have to 
be taken if confidence-building measures failed. The mechanism of safeguards is 
reasonable so long as it is respected. The problem is that it can be abrogated 
unilaterally. 123 
Abolitionists argue that a significant benefit of the phased approach is that as 
progress is being made incrementally, political confidence in the disarmament process 
will increase, and technicCl;! barriers facing the regime can be resolved. For abolitionists, 
phased disarmament begins the nuclear states along the path to eliminating nuclear 
weapons, and it does so in a graduated and reasonable manner. Abolitionists assert that 
problems could be resolved as .they would be encountered, but in a world where dramatic 
reductions would have already taken place. For abolitionists, any movement toward zero 
is better than the status quo. They argue that it is better to begin now, even with 
uncertainties regarding the ultimate feasibility of a NWFW, than to remain fixed in a 
world with thousands of nuclear weapons. l24 
C. VERIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT REGIME 
Abolitionists such as Steven Fetter contend that while "no verification regime 
could provide absolute assurance [against cheating], verification could be good enough to 
reduce remaining uncertainties to a level that might be tolerable in a more transparent and 
123 H. Gruem, "Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight," IAEA Bulletin 23, no. 4 
(1981): 10-14, quoted in Avner Cohen, "The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation 
Debate," International Perspectives on Counter proliferation, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Herald Mueller 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995),86. 
124 The National Academy of Sciences, 8. 
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trusting international environment.,,125 Abolitionists contend that verification would 
work in tandem with political confidence-building measures and transparency to 
safeguard against cheating, or breakout, in a NWFW regime. They assert that societal 
verification, or citizen reporting, would further inhibit breakout. Present throughout the 
various phases of reduction to zero nuclear weapons are increasingly stringent 
requirements for effective verification measures. For nuclear force reductions to occur, 
adequate verification is essential. Unless countries have confidence that all other nations 
would adhere to the terms of a NWFW regime, they are unlikely to submit to a 
disarmament agreement. A primary requirement for any feasible NWFW regime would 
be adequate measures to detect cheating. 
Abolitionists acknowledge that no verification regime would be sufficient to 
prevent breakout. For example, while it is agreed that safeguards are an extremely 
important measure in any non-proliferation regime, many, such as Richard Kokoski, 
question how effective they can be, especially in uncovering clandestine nuclear weapon 
activity.126 The International Atomic Energy Ag~ncy (IAEA) has acknowledged that 
there are currently no technical tools to detect clandestine weapons activities at 
undeclared facilities. 127 Conducting clandestine nuclear activities at undeclared facilities 
would likely be a primary means through which a country would attempt breakout. If 
125 Steven Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
1996), accessed on 5 July 1998, available fromhttp://www.stimson.org. 1. 
126 Richard Kokosld, Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 193. 
127 C. Paul Robinson and Kathleen C. Bailey, "To Zero or Not to Zero: A US Perspective on 
Nuclear Disarmament," Security Dialogue 28, no. 2 (1997): 156. 
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such facilities posed significant problems, then confidence in any verification regime 
would be limited. 
Abolitionists assert that societal verification would be a useful tool in detecting 
cheating and inhibiting breakout. Societal verification would be defined as citizens 
notifying appropriate international authorities of suspected breaches of a NWFW 
treaty. 128 Rewards could begranted to individuals providing information to authorities. 
Additionally, a NWFW treaty would include articles to protect citizens who report 
violations from receiving retribution by their home country. 
A problem with reliance upon societal verification is that it would likely be least 
effective in places where it would be most required, totalitarian states. The level of 
secrecy attainable in totalitarian states would limit the ability of citizens to learn of an 
unauthorized nuclear program. Abolitionists would then rely upon actual workers in a 
covert nuclear program. The effective enforcement of a NWFW regime, however, could 
not rely upon such workers to signal to an international organization the violations by 
their country. The workers would not only be sacrificing their careers, but also possibly 
their lives and the lives of their families. Additionally, the workers in such an important 
and sensitive program likely would not believe that they were doing anything wrong. 
Indeed, they might be convinced that they were supporting their country's security. 
128 J osepb Rotblat, "Societal Verification," A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World, ed. J osepb Rotblat, 
Jack Steinberger, Bbalcbandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 105. 
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Abolitionists acknowledge that technological measures alone would not be 
adequate to safeguard treaties aiming at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.129 
However, they vary significantly in the degree of reliance they place on technology. 
Steven Fetter hedges considerably regarding the ability of a verification regime to 
adequately prevent breakout: 
Although the possibility of rapid breakout will be ever present in modem 
industrial society, verification could provide the steady reassurance that would be 
necessary to dissip~te residual fears of cheating. Verification will never be so 
effective that it can substitute for good relations between nations, but it can play 
an essential role in consolidating the trust that is necessary to support the ongoing 
process of reducing nuclear arsenals, perhaps all the way down to zero.130 
This statement poses significant problems for the abolition argument. It is difficult to 
imagine that states would readily eliminate their nuclear arsenals while believing that "the 
possibility of rapid breakout will be ever present." As with most proposals for 
verification, Fetter's statement has the implicit requirement for "good relations between 
nations" or at least some mechanism of transparency, despite claims to the contrary. 
Unless relations between NWS are similar in nature to those between the United States 
and the United Kingdom, for example, no regime is likely to provide the degree of 
confidence required to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
Certain abolitionists, such as Josef Rotblat, believe that technology is currently 
available that will provide adequate verification: "Even at the present state of the art, 
technical verification is sufficiently developed to protect treaties aiming at reducing 
129 Rotblat, 104. 
130 Fetter, 1. 
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nuclear arms down to very low levels, of the order of a few percent of the present 
arsenals."l3l The problem with this argument is that a small percentage of current nuclear 
arsenals potentially represents a huge number of nuclear weapons. Graham Allison and 
his colleagues at Harvard University describe the magnitude of the Russian nuclear 
accounting problem: 
Consider the implications of a four percent error margin in Russian inventory 
accuracy: since Russia possesses on the order of 100,000 critical masses worth of 
fissile material, some 4,000 weapons' worth of fissile material would be floating 
unaccounted for in the margins of Russia's inventory accuracy. Even if Russia's 
material control and accounting system were 99 percent accurate (a level of 
inventory accuracy almost never achieved even by Western corporations), this 
would leave 1,000 weapons' worth of fissile material unaccounted for. 132 
Thus, sufficiently accounting for and verifying all of Russia's fissile material, even in the 
unlikely event that the Russians totally cooperated, would be nearly impossible. If it were 
possible that Russia had "misplaced" the fissile material required for 1,000 nuclear 
weapons, it is unlikely that any NWS would willingly disarm. 
Accounting for fissile material is not the only challenge that Russia could pose for 
a NWFW regime. The United States does not know how many nuclear weapons or 
warheads the Soviet UnionlRussia has built, nor the size of Russia's current stockpile. If 
Russia were to cheat and declare a lesser amount of nuclear weapons than it actually 
possesses, there would be no way to detect or prove the discrepancy.133 There are no 
131 Rotb1at, 104. 
132 Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. Fa1kenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding 
Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996),38. 
133 Robinson and Bailey, 154. 
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national technical means to locate hidden nuclear weapons. Even with unrestricted 
inspections, it would be impossible to find all hidden nuclear materials. There would be 
no way to pinpoint where to look, and materials could be secretly transferred with little to 
no probability of detection. David Kay, team leader on several inspections for the United 
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), has stated that "we should not 
underestimate the difficulty that exists in reaching judgements of non-compliance with 
arms control obligations.,,134 The continuing problem of verifying the elimination of 
Iraq's WMD programs - a defeated country inspected under conditions of unprecedented 
intrusiveness - indicates the great difficulty inherent in attempts to verify the compliance 
of an unwilling country in a NWFW regime. 
The high degree of error possible in estimating Russian warhead inventories was 
highlighted in 1993, when Viktor Mikhailov, the Director of Russia's Ministry of Atomic 
Energy (Minatom), stated that the Russian arsenal had peaked at 45,000 warheads in the 
mid-1980s - 12,000 more than generally believed. 135 If Russia cheated, it would be 
doubtful that violations of a NWFW regime could be detected in a reasonable amount of 
time. 
For abolitionists such as Gen. Andrew Goodpaster and Gen. Lee Butler, a major 
reason for the phased approach is that it would provide time to develop remedies for the 
gaps that currently exist in technical verification capabilities: "Because phased 
134 David Kay, "Detecting Cheating on Non-Proliferation Regimes: Lessons From the Iraqi 
Experience," unpublished paper, Science Applications International Corporation, 23 February 1998, 12. 
135 William J. Broad, "Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was Larger Than West Estimated," New 
York Times (26 September 1993): 1, quoted in Robinson and Bailey, 154. 
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withdrawal and destruction of nuclear weapons from all countries' arsenals would take 
many years ... to accomplish, time will be available - for work on technical 
problems .... ,,136 This reasoning assumes that technology will favor only the NWFW 
regime, and not potential cheaters. 
It must be presumed that cheaters would have the initiative. No countermeasures 
to their advanced concealment methods could be devised until or unless these methods 
were discovered. Furthermore, the use of underground and hidden facilities might never 
be countered by detection measures. The Russian underground facility at Yamantau 
mountain, the purpose of which Moscow has refused to clarify, is an example of such a 
facility. 137 
D. REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Abolitionists assert that strong cooperation among nations will compensate for 
deficiencies in verification capabilities by fostering trust through transparency and 
confidence-building measures. Abolitionists further argue that regional collaboration 
could help smooth the path to ultimate disarmament by binding smaller countries together 
in pursuit of a common goal.138 
136 General Andrew Goodpaster and General Lee Butler, Joint Statement on Reduction of Nuclear 
Weapons Arsenals: Declining Utility, Continuing Risks (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
1996), accessed on 4 June 1998, available fromhttp://www.stimson.org/generals/j-state.html. 5. 
137 Michael R. Gordon, "Despite Cold War's End, Russia Keeps Building a Secret Complex," New 
York Times (16 April 1996): 1, quoted in Robinson and Bailey, 150. 
138 Shalheveth Freier, "International Security in a NWFW," A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World, ed. 
Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 151. 
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International cooperation of the kind envisioned by abolitionists is not a very 
strong foundation upon which to base nuclear disarmament. It is true that war between 
countries such as Germany and France is unthinkable today, despite the centuries of 
animosity and war that ended in 1945. However, Israel and its neighbors are possibly 
generations away from such good relations. Another example of a bitter rivalry is the 
current relationship between India and Pakistan, but in this case, it is a rivalry between 
two nuclear-weapon states that tested nuclear warhead designs in May 1998.139 These 
nuclear tests have further deepened the antagonism and mistrust between the two 
countries and have created further barriers to nuclear disarmament. 
Analysts such as Samuel Huntington see a future in which not only will 
unprecedented cooperation be less likely, but in which civilizations will clash with each 
other along cultural fault lines. "These fault lines will be the battle lines of the future.,,140 
Thus, it is a rather large assumption that the progress in international cooperation over the 
next several years will be sufficient to compensate for the technical insufficiencies of a 
NWFW verification regime. 
Additionally, dependence upon multinational cooperation creates a dilemma for a 
NWFW. Sharing information with many states about the enforcement of a NWFW 
could, in itself, reveal information to a potential cheater. Abolitionists call for increased 
. reliance upon the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
139 "The Subcontinent Goes Nuclear," New York Times (29 May 1998), accessed on 20 Nov 98, 
available from http://www.nytimes.com. 
140 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizatio.Q.s?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 
22. 
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(IAEA) for enforcement and verification of a NWFW regime. Many of the personnel 
working in these organizations would undoubtedly come from the former nuclear-weapon 
states. They would be privy to critical information regarding verification and 
enforcement of the NWFW regime. Armed with this information, potential cheaters 
~ould more easily and successfully break out of the regime. 
Iraq is an example that demonstrates the negative side of increased cooperation 
and sharing of iIiformation. David Kay has pointed out that any shared intelligence 
necessarily provides clues for countermeasures. When, during the Iran-Iraq War, the 
United States shared strategic intelligence information with Baghdad, the Iraqis were able 
to analyze the data and ascertain how it was obtained to devise ways of denying 
information in the future. The Iraqis were thus able to successfully defeat national 
technical means (i.e., signal and satellite intelligence). 141 Thus, increased cooperation 
and information sharing at the level envisioned by abolitionists could be counter-
productive to the goal of preventing breakout. 
E. ENFORCEMENT OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT REGIME 
Abolitionists assert that there would be very little incentive for states to seek 
nuclear weapons in a nuclear-disarmed world. 142 Consequently, enforcement of a 
141 David Kay, "Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned," Eye on Supply, Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies (winter 1993), accessed on 5 April 1998, available from http://cns.miis.eduliraqlkay.html, 5. 
142 Andrew Mack, "Nuclear 'Breakout': Risks and Possible Responses," Canberra Commission 
Background Papers (Canberra, Australia: Canberra Commission, 1996), 19-20. It should be remembered 
that the world was "nuclear disarmed" - or, more precisely, "nuclear unarmed" - in the 1930s and early 
1940s, but the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan all perceived incentives 
to seek nuclear weapons. 
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NWFW regime is given little attention in the abolitionist literature. Some advocates of . 
nuclear disarmament, such as Richard Garwin, have advocated the possession of a small 
number of nuclear weapons by an international agency during the transition period to 
complete abolition.143 This would eliminate the possibility of a state acquiring a nuclear-
weapons monopoly, thereby reducing incentives for breakout. Other ways to deal with a 
cheater would involve diplomacy, economic sanctions, and military force. 
Garwin sees the maintenance of a small international nuclear arsenal as a viable 
alternative to a disarmed world. 144 The United Nations would control this force, and it 
would be used only in response to a nuclear attack by a breakout state. Andrew Mack of 
the Canberra Commission accepts this as a plausible alternative to a NWFW, but only if it 
would be a temporary step on the way to complete nuclear disarmament. Mack asserts 
that there would be little incentive to break out of a NWFW. For Mack, the issue of 
breakout is important and needs to be addressed, but the gravity of the problem should 
not be exaggerated. 145 
Abolitionists would rely upon diplomatic pressure from regime-respecting nations 
to inhibit cheating in a NWFW. Diplomacy could be used - abolitionists say - to 
persuade accused states to demonstrate their innocence, or to convince cheaters to 
143 Richard Garwin, "Nuclear Weapons for the United Nations?" A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World, 
ed. Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 169-
180. For Garwin, a primary justification for an international force would be the elimination of the double 
standard that allows certain states to possess nuclear weapons and prevents others from developing them. 
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surrender nuclear materials.146 Should diplomatic efforts fail, abolitionists assert, 
economic sanctions or military action could effectively return a state to compliance with a 
NWFW regime. Abolitionists argue that the UN Security Council would have little 
difficulty enacting an almost total and effective isolation of the violator, on the lines of 
what was done against Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the Gulf War. 147 
Abolitionists such as Andrew Mack see no utility in nuclear weapons today, and 
therefore overlook the risk that states might perceive utility in nuclear weapons in a 
nuclear-disanned world. In fact, compelling reasons exist for states to possess nuclear 
weapons. Many of these rationales - security concerns chief among them - would still 
exist in a NWFW. 
Abolitionists overstate the likelihood of states acting effectively in unison to force 
a cheater to comply with a NWFW regime. The problems that UNSCOM has 
experienced furnish a recent example of the difficulties in ensuring compliance with 
disannament regimes. Iraq is a defeated country and a pariah state with few real allies, 
and it has been subjected to the most intrusive inspection regime ever instituted. 
However, Iraq maintains a formidable biological and chemical weapons capability as well 
as significant elements of its nuclear program. Despite Iraq's continued violations of UN 
Security Council resolutions, countries such as Russia, China, and France are growing 
more vocal in their calls to remove economic sanctions against Iraq. These calls are 
146 James Leonard, Martin Kaplan, and Benjamin Sanders, "Verification and Enforcement in a 
NWFW," A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World, ed. Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar 
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occurring at a time when UNSCOM is encountering the greatest levels of obstruction by 
Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. 
According to Geoffrey Kemp, a member of President Reagan's National Security 
Council staff, "the big lesson from the February [1998 Iraqi] crisis was [that] you cannot 
use massive force, and it's going to take massive force to be effective on a technical 
violation. There's just no support for it in the region.,,148 Thus, even in an example 
involving the violation of UN Security Council resolutions, including continued 
development ofWMD, force appears not to be a readily available option, owing to 
political reluctance to commit massive conventional force to preserve arms control 
regimes. Would citizens of democratic countries willingly send their soldiers to fight 
against a nuclear-armed country for the cause of disarmament? Victory could not be 
considered certain. The most effective, and least risky, reaction to breakout might be the 
reconstitution or development of a nuclear arsenal by those states threatened by the 
breakout nation. 
The efficacy of economic sanctions is an issue of significant debate. One 
influential study concludes from an analysis of more than 1 00 c~ses that economic 
sanctions have worked to some extent about a third of the time. 149 Sanctions alone are 
unlikely to achieve results if the aims are large or time is short. For example, sanctions 
failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, although they were 
148 PBS's Newshour with Jim Lehrer (14 August 1998), accessed on 28 Oct 98, available from 
http:\\www.pbs.org. 
149 Gary Clyde Hutbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, History and Current Policy, 2d ed. (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1990), cited in Richard Haas, "Sanctioning Madness," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (NovemberlDecember 
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comprehensive and benefited from almost universal international participation for nearly 
six months. ISO 
Other notable cases where sanctions have failed include Iran and Pakistan. Iran 
remains defiant in its support of terrorism and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's 
recent detonations of several nuclear devices occurred despite U.S. sanctions.ISI In sum, 
economic sanctions are at best blunt instruments that may take many years to accomplish 
their goals. They do not appear to be well suited to persuading a breakout state, which 
likely would be unconcerned with world opinion,' to comply with a disarmament regime. 
Breakout could be the result of an immediate crisis. The long-term pain of economic 
sanctions would have little impact upon the decisions of a state in such circumstances. 
Enforcement was one of the main areas of disagreement preventing acceptance of 
the Baruch Plan. Abolitionists assert that the capabilities to enforce a NWFW exist, 
including. economic, political, and military action. However, political and economic 
efforts would not have a significant immediate impact. Additionally, the consensus 
required for multilateral military action, as demoIJ.strated by the Gulf War and its 
aftermath, is difficult to build and even more challenging to maintain. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite their assertions to the contrary, abolitionists overlook political constraints 
in assessing the feasibility of nuclear disarmament. Politics is an overriding factor in 
150 Haas, 75. 
151 Ibid, 76. 
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determining the feasibility of nuclear weapons abolition. Unrestricted inspection authority 
would be a minimum requirement for an effective verification regime. Until the 
functional equivalent of a world government is brought into being, it is unlikely that this 
authority would ever be granted. 
Technological means are not currently available that could verify compliance with 
a NWFW regime. Economic, political, or military enforcement would be ineffective in 
rolling back the nuclear capability of a determined cheater. Until verification and 
enforcement obstacles are overcome, nuclear disarmament is not possible. 
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V: CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the debate over abolishing nuclear weapons is a classical political 
debate. Abolitionists, like Kantians, see a world that is making progress toward ever 
more cooperative and interdependent international structures. They believe that a new era 
of international cooperation is on the horizon that ultimately will produce collective 
security and the subsequent abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. Opponents of 
abolition, like Machiavellians and Grotians, see the world as a collection of nation-states, 
with international politics regulated largely by power relations and with security concerns 
acting as a critical motivation in a state's behavior. Opponents of abolition reason that 
some states could elect, for a variety of reasons, to break out of a NWFW regime. 
Further, they judge that no state, if losing a war or facing a similarly grave crisis, would 
risk its own survival simply to maintain a NWFW regime.152 
As Professor Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, the Canberra Commission 
Report is a work of advocacy rather than of policy analysis.153 As such, it ignores sound 
arguments against nuclear disarmament. A NWFW is not feasible in the current 
geopolitical circumstances. No verification measures could prevent breakout. If cheating 
were to occur, marshalling the international support needed to roll back the nuclear 
capability of a breakout state would be extraordinarily difficult. Iraq is a case in point. It 
is a defeated country known to possess large quantities of prohibited chemical and 
152 These terms - Kantians, Machiavellians, and G!otians - correspond to the three main Western 
traditions of thinking about international relations identified by Martin Wight, a British historian. For a 
discussion of Wight's categories, see David S. Yost, "Political Philosophy and the Theory ofInternational 
Relations," International Affairs 70 (April 1994). 
153 Lawrence Freedman, "Nuclear Weapons: From Marginalisation to Elimination?" Survival 39, 
no.! (spring 1997): 187. 
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biological weapons and a nuclear weapons infrastructure. Yet, UNSCOM, with 
unprecedented authority and highly intrusive verification means, has been unable to force 
Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions aimed at eliminating Iraq's WMD 
capability. 
The abolitionist arguments for the desirability of nuclear disarmament have many 
flaws. Nuclear weapons have security roles beyond nuclear deterrence. The likelihood of 
accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons could be much greater in a nuclear re-
armament race, in which safety might not be a primary concern for a rapidly rearming 
state. Additionally, the safety and security of nuclear weapons can be increased through 
methods short of nuclear disaimament, which could in some circumstances have effects 
counter to those forecast by abolitionists. Indeed, abolitionists overlook the many ways 
that nuclear arsenals liave inhibited proliferation. Additionally, the marginal utility of a. 
single weapon in an emerging NWFW would soar as numbers of nuclear weapons 
decreased to zero. This would create enormous proliferation pressures and undo - in a 
potentially destabilizing and dangerous manner - any progress that had been achieved 
toward nuclear disarmament. 
The final judges regarding the desirability of maintaining nuclear arsenals are 
nation-states. As long as one NWS believes its nuclear arsenal. is necessary for its 
national security,a NWFW is not achievable. States such as Israel and Russia, for 
eXap1ple, would require a radical reshaping of the geopolitical environment before they 
would willingly surrender their last nuclear weapons. 
Abolitionists do not fully consider political constraints in their arguments. They 
are singularly concerned with the goal of nuclear disarmament. They have the logical 
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order of their goals reversed; the political environment necessary for nuclear disarmament 
must exist before the abolition of nuclear weapons can ever occur. The massive 
reduction in United States and SovietiRussian nuclear forces did not precede, let alone 
bring about, the end of the Cold War. Instead, these reductions were facilitated by and 
symbolized the improvement of political relations between the United States and the 
Soviet UnionlRussia in the late 1980s and early 1990s.154 A benign political environment 
capable of sustaining a NWFW must exist before any plan to abolish nuclear weapons 
can be implemented. 
In his memoirs Salvador de Madariaga, a distinguished figure in the League of 
Nations disarmament effort between the world wars, wrote: 
The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that the problem of war is tackled 
upside down and at the wrong end. Upside down first; for nations do not arm 
willingly. Indeed, they are sometimes only too willing to disarm, as the British 
did to their sorrow in the Baldwin days. Nations don't distrust each other 
because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And 
therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement of 
fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the 
weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily and without 
committees to tell them how they are to undress. 155 
Nuclear disarmament, if it ever were to occur, would be a result of favorable political 
conditions. It could not cause the political conditions that it requires for its success. 
Future nuclear weapons policy need not be built around cynicism or inflexibility. 
A diverse program of nuclear change has already been tackled since the end of the Cold 
154 Payne, 22. 
155 Salvador de Madariaga, Morning Without Noon (London: Saxon House, 1974),48-49, quoted 
in Quinlan, 67. 
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War, and it can be pursued further to yield a nuclear world of lower salience, smaller 
numbers, and even less real risk than now. 156 Making a commitment to near-term nuclear 
disarmament, however, will not necessarily aid such efforts. In fact, it could be counter-
productive. Making nuclear disarmament the central goal, at any cost, could distract from 
political and technical efforts - or provide a pretext for inaction or delay - when political 
realities indicate that near-term nuclear disarmament would be neither feasible nor 
necessarily desirable. The interests of United States would be much better served by 
pursuing policies that are sensible and achievable in the world as it is, not as we all might 
wish it to be. 
156 Quinlan, 68. 
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